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We may be in an age of devolution,' but that does not mean that the

geographic and economic externalities that hinder individual state action
have disappeared. Even absent federal preemption, a state may still be
powerless, for example, to control environmental problems that extend
beyond its boundaries. Another state might have to scuttle the corporate

* Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit. B.A. 1994, J.D. 1997, Yale University. I would like to thank Michael Graetz, Jerry
Mashaw, and Allan Erbsen for their comments on this Article.
1. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383 (1997) (holding that Congress
violated constitutional principles of state sovereignty by requiring state law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2043 (1997) (holding that Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts
from asserting jurisdiction over suits against states that go to the heart of a state's interest, even
when the complaint is couched to conceivably invoke traditional exceptions to immunity);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996) (finding that Congress lacked authority
under Indian commerce clause to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); United States
v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeds
Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce); Symposium, Constructing a New
Federalism:JurisdictionalCompetence and Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1996),
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tax or labor policies its citizens most prefer out of fear that businesses
would flee to friendlier jurisdictions. As such dilemmas become clear,
the interstate compact-little used or noticed in recent years-may
become an increasingly important method of coordination at the subfederal level.2 This Article examines the democratic implications of
such a resort.
An interstate compact is an exception to the rule that one legislature
may not restrict its successors.3 More than mere statutes, compacts are
contracts that are binding on the member states and their citizens.4 Like

2. Indeed, commentators from earlier eras have occasionally predicted that compacts
would enable states to address important problems. See WELDON V. BARTON, INTERSTATE
COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 165-66 (1967) ("Of course compacts have no formal
authority to decide on questions of federalism, but they may affect the balance of power between
the nation and the states. By augmenting the real or apparent effectiveness with which the states
handle governmental problems that are entrusted to them, interstate compacts may mitigate
social pressures for transfer of authority over such problems to the national government ....");
PARRIS N. GLENDENING & MAVIS MANN REEVES, PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM 282-83 (1977)
("Substantial evidence exists that the states use compacts to protect their power in the federal
system, and such use is applauded by the strong supporters of the states."); VINCENT V.
THURSBY, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: A STUDY OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACr 149 (1953)
(recommending interstate compacts wherever possible in order to preserve vitality of states and
avoid overburdened national government); Richard C. Kearney & John J. Stucker, Interstate
Compacts and the Management of Low Level Radioactive Wastes, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 210,
214 (1985) ([T'Mhe interstate compact provides an effective means for the states to act in a
positive manner in blocking federal encroachments on their sovereignty, while permitting the
states to work cooperatively in areas in which the federal government cannot or will not involve
itself.").
3. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting
"narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality" for "legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation"); Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932) ("[The will of a
particular Congress... does not impose itself upon those to follow in succeeding years.");
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 621 (1899) ("[E]ach subsequent
legislature has equal power to legislate upon the same subject. The legislature has power at any
time to repeal or modify [an] act."); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880) ("[N]o
legislature can curtail the power of its successors to make such laws as they may deem proper
in matters of police."); Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548 (1880) (allowing Ohio
legislature to move a county seat, notwithstanding decision by earlier legislature); Ohio Life Ins.
& Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1853) (holding that one session of legislature
could not limit ability of future session to impose taxes).
4. See West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); Hinderlider v. La
Plata River, 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725
(1838) ("The boundary so established and fixed by compact between [states], become [sic]
conclusive upon all the subjects and citizens thereof, and bind [sic] their rights ... ."); Poole
v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209-10'(1837) (boundary decision between states endowed
affected states' citizens with certain rights in land); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 92
(1823) ("Mhe terms compact and contract are synonymous.").
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any other statute, an interstate compact supersedes prior law.5 But as
with other contracts, the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution6 protects compacts from impairment by the states. Although a state
cannot be bound by a compact to which it has not consented,7 a
compact takes precedence over the subsequent statutes of signatory
states.8 A state may not unilaterally nullify, revoke, or amend one of its
compacts if the compact does not so provide,9 and the extent to which
a compact may constitutionally permit any alteration by less than
unanimous consent is unclear."0 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held
that a state may not withdraw from a compact on the ground that its
highest court has found the agreement to be contrary to the state
constitution. A transgressing state can be sued in federal court,"
with specific performance an available remedy.13
Compacts currently serve three functions. First, compacts resolve
state boundary disputes. Indeed, this was the purpose of all but one of

5. See Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 106 ("mhe [compact for water] apportionment is binding
upon the citizens of each State and all water claimants, even where the State had granted
[private] water rights before it entered into the compact.").
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cI. 1 ("No state shall ... pass any ...Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.").
7. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 462 (1931) (holding that Colorado River
Compact could not impair legal rights of noncompacting state).
8. See Green, 21 U.S. at 92 ("Mhe constitution of the United States embraces all
contracts, executed or executory, whether between individuals, or between a state and
individuals; ... a State has no more power to impair an obligation into which she herself has
entered, than she can the contracts of individuals.").
9. See Sims, 341 U.S. at 28 ("It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion
that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone have political
authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified ....");Green, 21 U.S. at 13 (holding
that a Kentucky law diminishing power of existing compact is unconstitutional).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 184-93.
11. See Dyer, 341 U.S. at 28 ('rhe Supreme Court of... West Virginia is, for
exclusively State purposes, the ultimate tribunal in construing the meaning of her Constitution.... [H]owever,... we are free to examine determinations of law by State courts in the
limited field where a compact brings in issue the rights of other States and the United States.");
see also id. at 35 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[I]f the compact system is to have vitality and
integrity, [West Virginia] may not raise an issue of ultra vires, decide it, and release herself
from an interstate obligation.").
12. See Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419,427 (1940);
Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 591 (1918); Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39, 55
(1870); see also irginia, 246 U.S. at 601 ("It follows as a necessary implication that the power
of Congress to refuse or to assent to a contract between States carried with it the right, if the
contract was assented to and hence became operative by the will of Congress, to see to its
enforcement.").
13. See Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 178 (1930).
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the thirty-six compacts enacted before 1921."4 Second, compacts
institutionalize one-shot interstate projects, most often involving the
allocation of natural resources (particularly water) 5 or the building of
bridges. 6 Third, and of primary concern here, compacts create ongoing
administrative agencies with jurisdiction over such varied and important
domains as resource management, public transportation, and economic
development."
Thus far, there have been few compacts-about 175 in all of United
States history. 8 Typically, compacts have emerged from political
14. See Brevard Crihfield, Interstate Compacts, 1783-1977: An Overview, in THE BOOK
OF THE STATES, 1978-79, at 580, 580 (1978). The one early compact that did not involve a
narrow boundary dispute was the Virginia-West Virginia agreement of 1862, which concerned
the separation of West Virginia from the Commonwealth of Virginia. See id. Inaccurate
surveying and vague and expansive colonial land charters made boundary disputes very common.
See JAMES T. ADAMS, THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND 216, 227, 320, 328 (1921); ALLAN
NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES: DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789, at 547,
578-79 (1927); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1893); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 660 (1838).
15. The Colorado River Compact of 1929 is the most notable apportionment agreement.
See 46 Stat. 3000 (1929) (presidential proclamation of compact's effectiveness); 45 Stat. 1057,
1064 (1928) (congressional approval); see also Sabine River Compact, Pub. L. No. 578, 68 Stat.
690 (1954); Yellowstone River Compact, Pub. L. No. 231, 65 Stat. 663 (1951); Arkansas River
Compact, Pub. L. No. 82, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); Snake River Compact, ch. 73, 64 Stat. 29 (1948);
Costilla Creek Compact, ch. 328, 60 Stat. 246 (1945); Belle Fourche River Compact, ch. 64, 58
Stat. 94 (1944); Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943); Cheyenne River
Compact, ch. 216, 44 Stat. 1247 (1943); Rio Grande River Compact, ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785
(1939); South Platte River Compact, ch. 46, 44 Stat. 195 (1923); La Plata River Compact, ch.
110, 43 Stat. 796 (1925).
16. See, e.g., New Jersey-Pennsylvania Turnpike Bridge Compact, Pub. L. No. 216, 65
Stat. 650 (1951); Missouri River Bridge Compact, Pub. L. No. 411, 63 Stat. 930 (1949);
Piscataqua River Bridge Compact, ch. 530, 50 Stat. 538 (1936); Missouri River Toll Bridge
Compact, ch. 44, 48 Stat. 105 (1933); Lake Champlain Bridge Compact, ch. 87, 45 Stat. 120
(1928).
17. See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961);
Bi-State Development Agency Compact, ch. 829, 64 Stat. 568 (1950); Northeastern Interstate
Forest Fire Protection Compact, ch. 246, 63 Stat. 271 (1949); Gulf States Marine Fisheries
Compact, ch. 128, 63 Stat. 70 (1947); Pacific Marine Fisheries Compact, ch. 316, 61 Stat. 419
(1947); Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact, ch. 283, 56 Stat. 267 (1942); Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact, ch. 581, 54 Stat. 752 (1940); Tri-State Water Commission
Compact, ch. 59, 52 Stat. 150 (1938); Interstate Sanitation Compact, ch. 779, 49 Stat. 932
(1935); New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921).
18. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGENCIES (1983)
(containing the most recent accounting). The pace of compacting has varied markedly over time.
While 36 compacts were adopted between 1783 and 1920, 65 were adopted between 1931 and
1955. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 3. The 1960s saw the enactment of 47 compacts, but the
pace has slowed since the beginning of the 1970s, a decade in which fewer than 20 compacts
were adopted. See Crihfield, supra note 14, at 580; GLENDENING & REEVES, supra note 2, at
279-80.
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accidents, state or private schemes to avoid federal regulation, or state
desperation.19 Yet the advantages of interstate cooperation in a devolutionary era suggest that compacts may soon enjoy much wider appeal.
First, the geographic case for regionalism is often undeniable. As of
1994, twenty-nine of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States
extended across state lines, ° creating frequent needs for interstate
coordination. In addition, there are a growing number of environmental,
transportation, developmental, and other problems that otherwise
transcend state boundaries,2 for which "[r]egional control... undoubtedly represents the technical ideal" and perhaps the only feasible
possibility.22 For instance, experience and science strongly suggest that
a river basin can be managed effectively only as a unit.23
Similarly, one of the basic insights of economics is that efficient
decisionmaking takes account of externalities. If each state acting
independently seeks to improve its own position by imposing costs on
others, then decisionmaking should be centralized to apply to the entire

19. See infra text accompanying notes 137-57.
20. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1996 tbl. 43, at 40-42 (116th ed. 1996).
21. See FRANK P. GRAD, I TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.04, at 3-372 (1995)
("As the federal law recognizes, problems of environmental pollution refuse to confine
themselves manageably within existing political boundaries. The 'problem shed' is likely to be
regional in dimension, and in the case of water pollution is likely to include not only numerous
municipalities and other local governments within metropolitan areas, but a number of states
within the same watershed, or served by one river or river system. For effective regional water
pollution control, therefore, the only presently available alternative to reliance on greater federal
involvement is a governmental entity established by agreement between a number of state
governments."); RICHARD H. LEACH & REDDING S. SUGG, JR., THE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 6 (1959); James P. Hill, The GreatLakes Quasi Compact: An Emerging
Paradigm for Regional Governance of U.S. Water Resources?, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 1,2
(discussing the use of compacts to meet "the challenge of water division pressures").
22. Richard 0. Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Jurisdictions,4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 238
(1974); see also BARTON, supra note 2, at 59; J.B. Ruhl, Interstate Pollution Control and
Resource Development Planning: Outmoded Approaches or Outmoded Politics?, 28 NAT.
RESOURCES J.293, 294-95 (1988) ("Yet it is even more apparent now [in 1988] than it was
twenty years ago 'that certain problems cannot be solved through jealous adherence to state
boundaries.' Many pollution and planning problems have simply outgrown the notion of state
boundaries.... In many ways, a continuing blind adherence to political boundaries has made
solutions to interstate pollution and planning problems virtually unreachable.").
23. See N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality-PartII: Interstate Arrangements for Pollution Control, 52 IOWA L. REV. 432, 457
(1966) ("mhe handling of water quality regulation on a regional basis is so sensible that it is
nearly inescapable."); Zerbe, supra note 22, at 235; Frederick L. Zimmermann, Intergovernmental Commissions: The Interstate-FederalApproach, 42 ST. GOV'T 120, 122 (1969) (reporting
that National Academy of Sciences publication designated river basin a "coherent hydrological
unit relevant to water control").
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affected area,24 everything else being equal.' For example, one of the
driving forces behind the Colorado River Compact, which apportioned
the river between upper and lower basins in preparation for further
apportionment among states, was that the preexisting regime granted
"priority of appropriation."26 This gave each state an overwhelming
incentive to use as much of the river as possible, which threatened
development in all the riparian states given the extreme scarcity of
water.2 Of course, arriving at a reasonable definition of the affected
area28 and designing rules to cover it are not always this simple.
Moreover, mistakes may shift the externality problem from between
states to between regions.2 9 But interstate compacts, with larger and
24. See Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary
Zoning, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.J. 49, 115 (1992) ("Interstate compacts help break down
fences where appropriate, providing a formal mechanism to reduce the jurisdictional component
of the transboundary spillover problem."); Dale D. Goble, The Compact Clause and
Transboundary Problems: "A Federal Remedy for the Disease Most Incident to a Federal
Government," 17 ENVTL. L. 785, 787 (1987) ("Because of their geographically limited political
responsibility, states are unlikely to restrict the conduct of their citizens to benefit the citizens
of another state. Out-of-state individuals cannot make their preferences known through the local
political market."); Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in Metropolitan
Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 831, 840 (1961); Marc J. Roberts,
Organizing Water Pollution Control: The Scope and Structure of River Basin Authorities, 19
PUB. POL'Y 75, 99-100 (1971); Ruhl, supra note 22, at 298 ("If interstate pollution and planning
regulation were left to each state's individual decisionmaking, each state could be faced with
a trade-off between fostering its own economic growth and protecting the quality of other states'
environments.... Even if it were certain that other states would [compensate the state for its
economic sacrifice], a rational, self-interested state might choose to let all other states make the
sacrifices necessary to protect the interstate environment, thus benefitting directly from their
sacrifices without affecting its own economic conditions. With all states thinking this way, of
course, no impetus for interstate pollution control or resource development planning exists.");
Zerbe, supra note 22, at 227 ("[Tjhe government responsiblefor environmental control should
be large enough to encompass the area of damages.").
25. See Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 PUB. CHOICE 19, 21-22, 25
(1964) (arguing that smaller governmental units give voters more voice and that bureaucratic
costs in form of agency effects will increase with size).
26. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (holding that priority of appropriation
governs litigation between states over equitable apportionment of stream).
27. See Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 10-12 (1966).
28. As Gordon Tullock and Marc J. Roberts have noted, many activities have some
external costs that only a global authority could internalize. While an interesting theoretical
point, there seems no cause to let the impossibility of perfection undermine the search for
improvement. See Roberts, supra note 24, at 100 ("Arguments for giving the agency enough
geographic scope to encompass all interactions are likewise insufficiently well-formulated to be
helpful. Again, water is related to almost all phases of economic activity, patterns of population
location, and so on. What area short of the nation, or the world, would encompass 'all' external
interactions?"); Tullock, supra note 25, at 19.
29. Joseph J.Spengler argued in 1937 that the problem of externalities precluded the
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more flexible jurisdictions, are better equipped to counter externalities
than an individual state's law, particularly given the general assumption
that externalities are a constantly diminishing function."
Beyond the basic insights that appear in the compact literature,
uniform standards are a clear means of addressing prisoner's dilemmas
in which the perceived threat of interstate competition leaves all states
worse off, with policies they otherwise would reject as contrary to the
public interest.3 Rather than allowing the threat of lost business to
make state environmental, labor, and regulatory policies far weaker than
the people would like them to be, for instance, state governments could
attempt to avoid these downward spirals by turning to agreements that
extend beyond state boundaries. Such a response would not be totally
effective unless it covered all possible sources of counterproductive
competition, which interstate compacts cannot often do.32 But it would
limit fears of being undercut close to home, when such inter-jurisdictional comparisons may be most important. Indeed, this type of
supposition seems to have spurred the recent meetings on welfare policy
between the ideologically like-minded governors of New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut.33
Yet while the benefits of compacting for devolutionists are clear, the
compacting form raises serious democratic concerns. Perhaps the core
meaning of democracy is that it allows the majority in a polity to
largely determine the shape of their government and the course of its
pursuits. No matter the benefits of permanency, there is still a tension
between this principle and long-term contracts by governments. Even if
compacts are the product of deliberative, collective self-determination,

effective use of regional compacts, contending that it was extremely unlikely that the effect of
a compact could be limited to the compacting states. He supported compacting only in the small
class of cases in which the costs would be internalized or compensating payments would be
made from the compacting to the noncompacting states. See Joseph J. Spengler, The Economic
Limitations to Certain Uses of Interstate Compacts, 31 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 41, 43 (1937).
30. See Frank P. Darr, Electric Holding Company Regulation by Multistate Compact, 14

ENERGY L.J. 357, 372 (1993). Spengler ignores this common view. See id.
31. The race-to-the-bottom literature is extensive. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalismand
the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058 (1993); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection,and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).

32. See Spengler, supra note 29, at 42 (discussing limits of regionalism).
33. See Jennifer Preston, Region's Governors Draw Own Blueprintfor Welfare, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, at Al.
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which often is doubtful, they severely hamper the people's ability to
continue to guide their own fate by strictly limiting a party state's power
to respond to changing preferences and circumstances. At the heart of
the meaning of compacts, this tension has gone essentially unexplored
by compact writers, who instead expound on the advantages of finality
and hail compacts as augmenting the voice of the citizenry as they
empower the states.34
The democratic tension this disability creates varies depending on the
subject matter of the compact, becoming more compelling the more
decisionmaking power the compact wields and the less integral
permanency is to the agreement's purpose. Functional democracy
frequently requires some measure of finality (and protection for minority
rights).35 Indeed, the United States Constitution itself ties the nation to
a historical agreement barring super-majority consensus for change.36
But the Constitution binds out of the conviction that certain established
institutions are necessary to make self-government possible, and it
leaves current legislators with substantial control. Permanency becomes
much more problematic for democracy when, as with agency compacts,
it insulates decisionmaking from popular control and prevents democratically-elected decisionmakers from responding to change. Furthermore,
the convention debates make clear that the Founders carefully considered both policy and forum in drafting the Constitution.37 In contrast,
every interstate agreement that potentially infringes upon federal power
must assume the compact form. 38 Even if compacting states recognize
the advantages of permanency-and they often do not-their lack of

34. See, e.g., JEROME C. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS 323 (1971) ("]nterstate
agreement on water problems is more in accord with traditional concepts of grass roots
democracy than is the imposition of a Congressional solution to a water allocation or quality
problem."); Meyers, supra note 27, at 52 ('Those who wish to bring decision making closer to
the voter will care [if compacts decline in use]. The action of a state legislature approving or
disapproving a compact is more likely to express the views of more voters in a signatory state
than is approval or disapproval by the Congress.").
35. Most notably, legislatures routinely bind themselves with bond obligations. Social
security and the highway trust fund, among other policies, bind the future as well.
36. For more on the tension between self-government and the permanency of the Constitution, see PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 8 (1992) ("No one lives in that state of grace in which all government
is self-government, in which the voice of authority is nothing other than the voice of the self.
People cannot live like that as long as they live within history.").
37. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 57-93 (1996); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC,

1776-1787 (1969).

38. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978).
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institutional options certainly limits the extent of their affirmative choice
to be bound.
Boundary compacts, which will not concern us beyond this section,
are perhaps the least problematic in democratic terms. While they
commit future state legislators to obeying a dictate of their predecessors,
this commitment is as narrow in content and muted in imposition on the
future as possible. Boundary compacts decide one, particular dispute
forever and do no more; they establish no operating or decisionmaking
mechanisms. They locate citizens' votes, but do not override them on
any substantive issue. Moreover, the benefits of permanency are obvious
for compacts that establish state boundaries: A settled boundary, no
matter how historically inaccurate, is more useful than any other kind.39
Other one-shot compact projects are somewhat more troublesome.
Although these compacts create no decisionmaking authority, the case
for permanency in matters like water allocation is at least somewhat
cloudy. State development often depends on a guaranteed water supply.
But whereas any fixed boundary is more valuable than an uncertain one,
popular evaluation of the content of water allocation decisions, which
may change over time, seems at least as important as the fact that the
matter has been resolved.
At the other end of the spectrum are compacts that establish
administrative agencies with jurisdiction over important aspects of
economic or social life,' which have become increasingly common
since New York and New Jersey compacted to establish a Port
Authority in 1921."' By necessity, these ongoing enterprises, the focus
of this Article, must constantly make choices that the compacting state
governments did not anticipate at the time of enactment. Even if agency
compacts rigorously attempt to facilitate public openness and state
oversight, which (as we will see) they generally do not,4' the important,
democratic check of a realistic possibility of amendment or termination
would still be missing. The more decisionmaking authority the agency
has, the more potentially dangerous the diminished ability of states to
govern the agencies they have created. In addition, the case for
permanency is significantly less compelling here than in the boundary
context. To be sure, the permanency of agency compacts may facilitate

39. See PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 21 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961);
New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921); Bi-State
Development Agency Compact, ch. 829, 64 Stat. 568 (1950).
41. See ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174 (1921) (text of compact creating the New York-New Jersey
Port Authority); HARDY, supra note 39, at 4; LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 6-7.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 106-16.
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43
long-term planning, property acquisition, and bond financing. Similarly, the finality-and enforceability-of agency compacts might also
seem particularly appealing to states hoping to avoid a "race to the
bottom," in which interstate cooperation would improve the situation of
each state only if no state reneges. As we will see, however, permanency's contribution to the efficacy of agency compacts is often
uncertain or unnecessary.' More to the point, by far the most legitimate reason to create an agency compact is to satisfy citizen needs or
preferences and to further the public interest. Whereas simply resolving
a troublesome issue is predominant in boundary matters and important
with other one-time projects, the purpose of agency compacts does not
suggest that maximizing the effectiveness of current policies, to the
extent that finality does that, should take precedence over responding to
subsequent changes in the democratic consensus. Furthermore, the
evidence indicates that states create agency compacts without much of
a theory about when such a recourse to permanency is appropriate." 5
The democratic tension within compacts is also much more
pronounced from the perspective of citizens than state governments,
which suggests that it may be yet harder to surmount. From the states'
point of view, federal preemption binds them essentially as much as
compacts do. In either case, change will be impossible (preemption) or
very difficult/impossible (compact) unless a state can convince the
federal government to change its policy by either altering its program
or overriding the compact agreement (a prospect discussed more fully
below).46 Although the problem of permanence is much more stark for
the states when federal preemption is not likely, threatened federal

43. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 3; MuYs, supra note 34, at 324; Richard H. Leach,
InterstateAuthorities in the United States, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 666, 670-71 (1961).
44. See infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
45. See infra text accompanying notes 142-57. In contrast, Congress specifically and
deliberately created the independent regulatory agencies to be relatively permanent institutions,
whose commissioners are appointed for set terms and subject to presidential removal only for
cause. Congress determined that this permanency was necessary if these agencies were to fulfill
their intended function as a check on executive power. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
687-88 (1988) ("In Humphrey's Executor, we found it 'plain' that the Constitution did not give
the President 'illimitable power of removal' over the officers of independent agencies. Were the
President to have the power to remove FTC Commissioners at will, the 'coercive influence' of
the removal power would 'threate[n] the independence of [the] commission.' " (quoting
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935)); Humphrey's Executor,
295 U.S. at 629 (upholding limitations on the president's power to remove Federal Trade
Commissioners because "it is quite evident that one who holds office only during the pleasure
of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's
will").
46. See infra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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action spurs most compacts.47 From the people's perspective, however,
federal preemption-whatever its other problems-means that the
responsible institution of democratic government is free to change its
policies as its judgment dictates and to use the threat of change as a
means of control. In contrast, compacts seriously disable the democratic
institutions most likely to be concerned-the states-from significantly
altering their plans or wielding that threat.
Recognizing this tension does not necessarily mean abandoning
agency compacts. But the problem of permanency does suggest a
fundamental need to reevaluate them: the value of the constitutional
requirement that Congress consent to all state agreements with the
potential to" 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the
United States;' "4 the compact negotiating process; the powers
compact agencies possess; and, perhaps most importantly, which issues
are resolved through agency compact.
The jurisprudence on compacts is aged. Given the political pressures
for devolution and the Supreme Court's recent attentiveness to state
autonomy,49 this body of law is likely to be revisited. As long as the
problem of permanency remains, states should resort to compacts only
when their advantages are most compelling: when the problem at hand
requires a regional response; when any interstate agreement must be a
compact because it may infringe on federal authority; when Congress is
unable or unwilling to act; and when the compact agreement itself is
drafted to mitigate democratic concerns. However, if the Court
concludes, as I argue it should, that the contract impairment clause does
not bar compacts that liberalize termination and amendment, then the
agency compact may fulfill its potential as a valuable tool in a
devolutionary era when geography, economics, or a prisoner's dilemma
of interstate competition demand a solution extending beyond one state's
lines.
I. REEVALUATING CONGRESSIONAL CONSENT AND
DISPROPORTIONATE BINDINGNESS
Congress' role is the first issue that should be reexamined in light of
the democratic tension within compacting. Every interstate agreement
must win the approval of the party state legislatures, but only some

47. See infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
48. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978)
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1979) (quoting and affirming Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893))); see also id at 472 ("Mhe pertinent inquiry is one
of potential, rather than actual, impact upon federal supremacy.").
49. See supra note 1.
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interstate agreements are compacts, directly bound to the compact
jurisprudence on permanency and constitutionally required to garner
congressional as well as state assent."0 Only those agreements that may
" 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States' ,51 must take the compact form and receive Congress' consent.
Yet Congress, unlike the states, is not bound by the compacts it
approves. It can condition its consent or simply supersede its approval
legislation with subsequent law. 2
From the states' perspective or that of people who support compacts
as a way to increase state power, this asymmetry is yet another reason
to be reluctant to compact. Not only are the states bound almost
irrevocably, 53 but the omnipresent threat that Congress will change its
mind deprives them of the full benefit of reliance. However, from a
democratic perspective, the fact that Congress (perhaps with some state
encouragement) can undo an agreement to which the states are largely
confined mitigates the problem of permanence, although this certainly
does not remove most cause for concern. A compact agency may be
essentially immune from the threat of termination or alteration by the
states, which presumably would want to supervise the enterprise they
initiated most closely. But if matters become truly disastrous, Congress
may be induced to pull the plug, amend the compact, or threaten
either-perhaps emphasizing the point by withdrawing a portion of the
financial and other support that the federal government provides to some
compact agencies. These are far from ideal means of democratic control,
particularly since congressional supervision and interest are much less
likely in areas in which the states have taken the lead. Still, congressional freedom from permanency is a reassuring last resort.
Although limited in its democratic vision, the jurisprudence on
congressional approval provides Congress with a powerful institutional
position from which to control the use and content of compacts. Almost
exclusively, the case law stresses the need to prevent undue harm to
non-compacting states54 and "to ensure that Congress ... maintain[s]
ultimate supervisory power over cooperative state action that might
otherwise interfere with the full and free exercise of federal authority."55 Unconcerned by the particular constraints of the compact form,
50.
51.
148 U.S.
52.
53.
54.
v. Tobin,
55.

See United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 469.
Id. at 471 (quoting New Hampshire,426 U.S. at 369 (quoting and affirming Virginia,
at 519)). Like any other statute, approval legislation is subject to presidential veto.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 3-13.
See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838); United States
195 R Supp. 588, 606 (D.D.C. 1961); HARDY, supra note 34, at 13.
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); see also Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155,
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the Supreme Court has found that Congress may consent in advance,
sacrificing some power over the final form of compacts in order to
encourage specific agreements. 6 The Court will also imply consent
from congressional action," making formation of a compact even
easier.
While the Court has conceived of congressional consent fairly
narrowly, Congress' power of refusal allows it to make a much broader
judgment about both submitted agreements and the responsibility its
approval power entails. In light of the limitations of the compact form,
this is a crucial opportunity to gauge the need for a compact and the
degree of democratic tension the compact agreement creates. Given the
fact that the democratic content of compacts has long been ignored, it
is not surprising that there is no evidence that this sort of analysis
presently takes place.
Congress has rarely granted consent in advance, 8 but it has

170 (1894); Tobin, 195 F. Supp. at 606; HARDY, supra note 39, at 13.
56. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 441 ("Congress may consent to an interstate compact by
authorizing joint state action in advance or by giving express or implied approval to an
agreement [which] the States have already joined.") (citing Virginia, 148 U.S. at 521); Virginia,
148 U.S. at 521 ("The constitution does not state when the consent of congress shall be given,
whether it shall precede or may follow the compact made, or whether it shall be express or may
be implied. In many cases the consent will usually precede the compact or agreement. .. ").
57. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 441; Virginia, 148 U.S. at 521 ("[C]onsent may be implied,
and is always to be implied when congress adopts the particular act by sanctioning its objects
");Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39, 59-60
and aiding in enforcing them ....
(1870); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-86 (1821) ("The only question... is, has
Congress, by some positive act in relation to such agreement, signified the consent of that body
to its validity?"). The extent of congressional action needed to support a finding of implied
consent is unclear.
58. The Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (1934), in which
Congress consented to interstate compacts dealing with interstate crime control, is perhaps the
most famous example of consent in advance. The Interstate Compact for the Supervision of
Parolees and Probationers, which includes all 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands,
derives its consent from this Act. The compact was never submitted to Congress. See Cuyler,
449 U.S. at 441; Kevin J. Heron, The Interstate Compact in Transition: From Cooperative State
Action to CongressionallyCoerced Agreements, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 16 (1985); Maryhelen
Sherrett, Note, Seattle Master Builders Association v. Pacific Northwest Electric Power and
Conservation Planning Council: The Constitutionality of the Northwest Experiment in
"Cooperative Federalism," 17 ENvTL. L. 971, 985 n.86 (1987).
Somewhat earlier, in the Weeks Act of 1911, 16 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), Congress granted
advance consent to
each of the several States of the Union to enter into any agreement or compact, not
in conflict with any law of the United States, with any other State or States for the
purpose of conserving the forests and the water supply of the States entering into
such agreement or compact.
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historically consented to submitted agreements almost automatically. 9
Although Congress has been somewhat more rigorous in recent years,
its review of proposed compacts only infrequently ventures beyond the
airing of classic concerns about state encroachment, particularly into the
jurisdiction of unsympathetic federal agencies.'
While this history indicates that Congress must be persuaded to
exercise meaningful control over the resort to agency compacts, it does
not negate the inherent power of that body's institutional location in the
compacting process. Indeed, Congress has more than just the ability to
prevent compacting where the need is not great. The Supreme Court has
also found that Congress' right to reject compacts includes the power to
consent conditionally,6 which allows direct and sophisticated tailoring
to mitigate democratic concerns. In fact, some federal consent legislation
Id.
Congress has not acted on requests for general consent-in-advance legislation. See LEACH
& SuGG, supra note 21, at 49-50. In fact, President Roosevelt vetoed one of the few consent-inadvance statutes as overly broad. See 84 CONG. REC. 11,175 (1939).
59. See MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTs: A QUESTION OF FEERALISM 21
(1971); Kearney & Stucker, supra note 2, at 212. President Roosevelt's 1942 veto of the
Republican River Compact on the grounds that it would limit national control over a navigable
waterway and "restrict the authority of the United States to construct irrigation works and to
appropriate water for irrigation purposes in the basin," 88 CONG. REC. 3286 (1942), was a rare
exception to this perfunctoriness. The agreement was subsequently revised and approved a year
later. See ch. 104, 57 Stat. 86 (1943).
In addition, Congress limited its consent to the 1935 Interstate Compact for the Conservation
of Oil and Gas to three-year periods out of concern that the compact commission would violate
antitrust laws. See ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939, 940-41 (1935); MUYS, supra note 34, at 376.
60. See Kearney & Stucker, supra note 2, at 212; Zerbe, supra note 22, at 226-27;
Zimmermann, supra note 23, at 124; Frederick L. Zimmermann & Mitchell Wendell, Interstate
Compacts, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1960-61, at 239 (1960).
But see Robert C. Ellickson, Public Property Rights: A Government's Rights and Duties
When Its Landowners Come into Conflict with Outsiders, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1627, 1654-55
(1979) ("Congress has contributed to [the] glacial pace [of compact creation] by declining to
rubberstamp interstate agreements, and instead insisting on undertaking its own review of the
merits of each agreement. For example, in the late 1960's when it was in the process of
amending the Clean Air Act, Congress refused to approve several interstate air pollution
compacts pending before Congress."). The overall evidence strongly suggests that the fate of
these environmental agreements was unusual, the consequence of the imminent preemptive
federal legislation. See GRAD, supra note 21, § 2.05, at 2-563 to -565 (1995) (describing specific
constraints Congress has placed on air pollution control compact formation); Leonard Weakley,
Interstate Compacts in the Law of Air and Water Pollution, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 81, 88
(1970) ("The emphasis of the Federal programs for the abatement of both air and water pollution
has been directed toward the development of Federal organizations designed to cover the entire
country.").
61. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 439-40; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359
U.S. 275, 281-82 (1959); James v. Dravo Constructing Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937) (citing
Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 345 (1934)).
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has already limited compact agencies to their enumerated functions or
imposed disclosure requirements 62-- first steps toward judiciously
controlling the decisionmaking power of compact administrators.
Furthermore, Congress' ability to impose conditions that demand
ongoing compliance, which includes the right to require federal
representation on a compact commission,' increases the likelihood that
compact agencies will be subject to congressional monitoring, or at least
subject to legal control through litigation that holds the agency to its
original agreement even if it does not allow for change.'
This is not to suggest that Congress has truly begun to consider how
its right of conditional consent can best be wielded, or that the law
governing conditional consent, like the law controlling consent
generally, unambiguously advances democratic control. Congress
generally attaches conditions only sparingly, and then mainly to prevent
infringements on federal jurisdiction.' Usually these conditions do not
require ongoing monitoring.66 Moreover, the Supreme Court held in
one instance that party states had implicitly acquiesced to conditions that
Congress placed on an agreement the states had already ratified.67

62. See Pub. L. No. 86-375, 73 Stat. 694, 698 (1959) (limiting Wabash Valley Compact
to enumerated functions and requiring congressional consent for each new duty states impose
on compact agency); Pub. L. No. 85-734, 72 Stat. 823, 828 (1958) (same for Tennessee Valley
River Basin Water Pollution Compact); ch. 829, 64 Stat. 568, 571 (1950) (limiting Bi-State
Development Compact Agency to enumerated powers in response to compact provision
authorizing agency to exercise additional functions granted by states); ch. 316, 61 Stat. 419, 422
(1947) (imposing annual reporting requirement on Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission); ch.
283, 56 Stat. 267, 270 (1942) (imposing reporting requirement on Atlantic States Marine
Fisheries Commission); Heron, supra note 58, at 16.
63. There are several federal-interstate compacts. See, e.g., The Delaware River Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat. 688 (1961); The Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub.
L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970); and the Agreement on Detainers, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909
(1934). Federal compact representatives normally observe, offer advice, and provide financial
and other assistance, but do not vote. See GRAD, supra note 21, § 3.04, at 3-377; Emanuel
Celler, Congress, Compacts, and InterstateAuthorities, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 682, 691
(1961); Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, State Supremacy in the FederalRealm: The Interstate
Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751, 763-64 (1991) (discussing advantages of federal
participation in interstate compacts). The Supreme Court has indicated that it has no objection
to federal participation in compacts. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27-28
(1951).
64. The latter option would require consideration of what particular standing rules apply
in this area, a topic beyond the scope of this Article.
65. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 50-51; Sherrett, supra note 58, at 986.
66. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 18.
67. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1959) ("The
States who are parties to the compact by accepting it and acting under it assume the conditions
that Congress under the Constitution attached.").
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While the limits of this proposition are not clear," it seems extremely
problematic in democratic terms for a state to be tightly bound to a
compact whose final form did not weather the state's formal democratic
process and the public scrutiny that entails, even if the official or
administrator in charge of compact implementation ultimately accepted
Congress' change. Given the democratic tension within compacting,
Congress has a responsibility to use its power of conditional consent to
scrutinize compacts, while taking care that states, at least at the moment
of enactment, are not bound against their will.
Like its power to reject compacts or to consent conditionally,
Congress' authority to amend or override compacts with subsequent
legislation is an important, if not wholly satisfying, check on the extent
to which compacts may bind a state's citizens to an agreement that has
lost democratic support: If a compact falls seriously out of favor with
enough people, there is a chance that Congress will free the states from
their outdated accord.69 Moreover, unlike elsewhere in the compact
jurisprudence, the law is clear on Congress' ability to alter or entirely
preempt compacts to which it has agreed, whether or not the original
compact legislation specifically reserves that right.
68. Presumably, the more fundamental the congressional condition, the more difficult the
conflation of state acquiescence and approval. The condition in Petty, for instance, stated that
nothing in the compact should be construed to impair federal jurisdiction over interstate
commerce and navigable waterways. See id. at 277-78. This stipulation did not substantially
change the compact. Indeed, one might argue that Congress had not actually imposed a condition
at all because it simply restated the standard view that federal law must always be supreme over
state law in the area of interstate commerce. See id.
69. My point applies only to agency compacts. Overturning boundary agreements would
be counterproductive. Tellingly, the Court's early boundary compact cases occasionally included
dicta suggesting that Congress did not have the power to amend or repeal compacts it had
approved. See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838) (declaring that
a boundary compact operated "with the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers");
Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (I1 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) (stating that the right to compact is a right
of the states, only limited by Congress' power to grant or deny consent).
70. See Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 418 (1917) ("Congress is
not prevented by the Constitution from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts, and
in its enactments the presence or absence of [a specifically reserved right to alter, amend, or
repeal the compact to which it is consenting] has not the same peculiar significance that it has
in state legislation. It is no doubt a circumstance, but not by any means conclusive.");
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1855) (holding
that Congress may enact legislation incompatible with compact to which it had previously
granted consent, relying on rationale that one Congress may not impair constitutional legislative
authority of subsequent Congress); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 58990 (D. Colo. 1983) (holding that congressional approval of a compact does not limit
congressional authority to subsequently enact laws inconsistent with the compact); Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery County, 490 F. Supp. 1328,
1333 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 706 F2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Port Auth. Bondholders
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Concentrating on the democratic content of compacting reveals the
potential mitigating force of Congress' ability to reject compacts, to
consent conditionally, and to override ongoing compact enterprises.
However, all of the previous discussion assumed an interstate agreement
that must secure congressional approval and become an official compact
because it may" 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of
the United States.' "71 When interstate agreements do not have to
become compacts, and thus directly subject to the compact jurisprudence
on permanency, they should not do so. The ameliorating power of
Congress' role does not overcome the problems with the compact form.
For this reason, the Court's recent ruling in Cuyler v. Adams72 is
extremely troublesome. Cuyler held that every interstate agreement
concerning "an appropriate subject for congressional legislation"
becomes a compact upon congressional consent, regardless of whether
such consent was constitutionally necessary.' By all accounts, the

Protective Comm. v. Port of New York Auth., 270 F. Supp. 947, 950 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 387 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1967) (same). However, Congress may be obliged to compensate states who have
detrimentally relied on compacts that Congress subsequently amended or revoked. See
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).
At least one scholar has argued that principles of quasi-contract may bind Congress. See
Charles B. White, The EmergingRelationship Between EnvironmentalRegulationsand Colorado
Water Law, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 597, 630 (1982). While dicta in early boundary cases supports
this theory, see supra note 69, the general view is that it would be inconsistent with both current
case law and "the intent of the Framers of the Constitution if Congressional approval were
construed as limiting, rather than preserving, federal power." White, supra, at 631.
In addition, some dicta in one D.C. Circuit case, Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), may suggest that while Congress may enact laws that require the amendment or
termination of existing compacts, it cannot directly amend or revoke its consent to a compact
and do nothing more. See id. at 273-74. Somewhat ambiguously, the court at one point called
this argument "not unpersuasive," id. at 274, although it did not reach the issue in deciding the
case, id. at 275-76. This distinction seems extremely odd analytically, but presumably it would
simply reshape the form, not the content, of overriding legislation.
71. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978)
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1979) (quoting and affirming Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893))).
72. 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
73. Id. at 440. As the Court explained the matter:
Where an agreement is not "directed to the formation of any combination tending
to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or
interfere with the just supremacy of the United States," it does not fall within the
scope of the [Compact] Clause and will not be invalidated for lack of congressional
consent.... But where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a
cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an
appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms
the States' agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.
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74
difficulty of determining which interstate agreements require consent
pushes states to seek approval in most cases.' Under Cuyler, this turns
all of these agreements into compacts.76 Particularly given Cuyler's
failure to define the limits of "appropriate,"' the decision may do
much to countermand any democratically-inspired attempt to limit the
use of compacting as much as possible. Extending the well-settled rule
that consent need not be express or direct78 to circumstances in which
consent was never necessary would place even more interstate agreements within the confines of the compact form. All in all, Cuyler makes
it yet more important for Congress to wield its power of consent
carefully, to seek federal solutions to problems that extend beyond one
state's boundaries, and to allow interstate agreements that do not need
to become compacts to remain free from the burden of that jurisprudence.

II. STATES IN COMPACT NEGOTIATION

Focusing on the problem of permanency sheds new light on the
possibility inherent in Congress' freedom from boundedness and on the
limitations of the jurisprudence on congressional consent. It also does
much to transform the meaning of the way states come to the agreements that they ultimately submit for federal approval. The compact
literature has assumed the basic viability of the form and directed its
criticism toward the supposedly inordinate delays that accompany
interstate agreements.79 But arriving at an agreement promptly becomes
far less important than achieving the most satisfactory accord possible
once one sheds the premise of essential soundness and keeps foremost
the democratic tension within compacts. If states are going to be tightly
bound to their compacts regardless of their shifting policy goals, a
Id. (quoting United States Steel, 434 U.S. at 468).
74. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 13 (' The congressional consent requirement has been
and continues to be the most litigated and contested aspect of interstate compacts."); RIDGEWAY,
supra note 59, at 46-47 (suggesting difficulty of arriving at a "fixed policy or formula" for
determining which compacts require consent); infra text accompanying notes 160-64.
75. See Celler, supra note 63, at 686; Ellickson, supra note 60, at 1654-55; David E.
Engdahl, Characterizationof Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact, 64
MICH. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1965) ("[D]raftmen have been so uncertain of the scope and
application of the compact clause that until very recently nearly every formal interstate
arrangement has been submitted for congressional consent.").
76. See Cuyler,449 U.S. at 440 ("[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into
a cooperative agreement .... the consent of Congress transforms the States' agreement into
federal law.").
77. Id.
78. See cases cited supra note 57.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
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lengthy negotiating process becomes a facially desirable means of
enabling states to reach agreements that best reflect the democratic
consensus, at least at the time of enactment.
Perhaps the foremost complaint made about compacts centers around
the twin postulates that their enactment "requires something like
geological time""0 and that this delay is the largest and most unfortunate obstacle to compacts becoming "a viable alternative to direct
federal intervention for solution of interstate ... problems."'" Although
recent data is sketchy, writers frequently cite studies indicating that
compacts take between four and nine years to enact and lament that the
states and Congress have not been able to proceed more rapidly. 2

80. HAROLD J. LASKI, THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 156 (1948).
81. Note, InterstateAgreementsfor Air Pollution Control, 1968 WASH. U. L.Q. 260,264;
see also HARDY, supra note 39, at 20-21 (quoting THURSBY, supra note 2, at 138) ("One of the
most frequently heard criticisms of interstate compacts concerns the lengthy time period involved
in initiating, negotiating, and ratifying them. Compact negotiation has been described as being
'a slow and cumbersome process at best,' and it has been deemed comparable in difficulty to
international negotiations."); MUYS, supra note 34, at 326 ("An often voiced criticism of the
compact approach to regional water resources management is that compacts require an
exceedingly long time to negotiate and effectuate by state ratification and Congressional
consent."); Jerome C. Muys, Interstate Compacts and Regional Water Resources Planningand
Management, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 153, 168 (1973) (same); Lois G. Forer, Water Supply:
Suggested FederalRegulation, 75 HARV. L. REV. 332, 342 (1961) ("[P]rolonged and uncertain
[compact] negotiations of necessity impede if not prevent the development of water resources.");
Frank P. Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-Operative Federalism, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 825, 854 (1963) ('To make compacts truly effective, states cannot afford the
luxury of several years' delay in negotiation and ratification, and Congress... should no longer
have to delay for years before granting its consent."). But see MUYS, supra note 34, at 331-32
("The record of compact negotiations suggests that where there has been sufficient motivation
to reach agreement, negotiations have been expedited.... Where there is no pressing need to
reach agreement, Parkinson's law undoubtedly prevails and the work of negotiation expands to
fill the time available to accomplish it.").
82. For the key studies, see ROSCOE C. MARTIN ET AL., RIVER BASIN ADMINISTRATION
AND THE DELAWARE 132 (1960) (reporting that negotiation, ratification, and consent for 19 river
management and control compacts took an average of eight years and nine months) (cited in
Forer, supra note 81, at 342 n.49; Grad, supra note 81, at 854 n.180; Zerbe, supra note 22, at
226 n.66; Note, Interstate Agreements, supra note 81, at 264 n.37); WALLACE R. VAWTER,
INTERSTATE COMPACS-THE FEDERAL INTEREST 11 (1954) (reporting that negotiation,
ratification, and consent process for 65 compacts lasted an average of four years and nine
months and that natural resource compacts t6ok an average of six years and nine months) (cited
in Kearney & Stucker, supra note 2, at 212); Paul T. Chambers, Water Pollution Control
Through Interstate Agreement, 1 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 43, 45 (1969) (finding that pollution
control compacts take an average of five years to negotiate, ratify, and obtain consent) (cited in
MUYS, supra note 34, at 327); see also Grad, supra note 81, at 827 ("It took exactly two years
from the completion of the [initial research study for the Delaware River Basin Compact] to the
final enactment of the compact-an accomplishment unheard of in the annals of water
compacts."); Meyers, supra note 27, at 12 (noting that despite "dire necessity of reaching an
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As a preliminary matter, most of this literature lacks context. The
average time required to bring a compact to completion is a meaningless
statistic without information about the other options: adjudication,
federal regulation, or individual state action. The comparative data that
is available, while anecdotal, suggests that the alternatives to compacting
are not necessarily more speedy. The federal government's efforts to
initiate projects that will allocate resources between states or between
public and private interests have been notoriously slow-moving. Indeed,
congressional apportionment of the lower Colorado River basin amongst
states required six years,83 the same amount of time needed to ratify
and approve the interstate compact that first divided Colorado River
water rights into two basins.84 The Tennessee Valley Authority, which
placed the federal government in charge of numerous development
activities in a multistate region,85 took seventeen years to enact.86
If anything, adjudication over interstate disputes is even slower than
either compacting or federal action. To cite an extreme example, federal
litigation to allocate the Truckee-Carson-Tahoe waters between
California and Nevada began in 1913 and did not end until 1990.87
Somewhat more typically, the special master that the Supreme Court
assigned to review Texas' challenge to the technical basis for allocation
under the Pecos River Basin Compact did not even issue his first report
for five years. While states can decide on an independent course
relatively easily, the impetus for interstate action generally arises
because uncoordinated action is hopelessly inefficient and ineffective
under the circumstances. 9 From this perspective, the time required to
compact appears far from inordinate.
More fundamentally, a lengthy negotiating process seems understandable, unavoidable, and wholly desirable in light of the permanency
compacts entail. If states are going to bind themselves, they should be
sure, at the very least, that their compacts represent the best solution
agreement," ratification and consent to Colorado River Compact took six years).
83. See MuYs, supra note 34, at 333.
84. See Meyers, supra note 27, at 12.
85. See ch. 32, 48 Stat. 58 (1933) (enacting statute for the Tennessee Valley Authority);
MARTHA DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED

STATES 18 (1974).

86. See MuYS, supra note 34, at 332.
87. See E. Leif Reid, Note, Ripples from the Truckee: The Case for Congressional
Apportionment of Disputed Interstate Water Rights, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 147, 153 (1995)
(noting that Congress settled the dispute over Lake Tahoe in 1990).
88. See Texas v. New Mexico, 446 U.S. 540 (1980) (approving special master's first
report).
89. See, e.g., Marc J. Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water
Pollution, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1527, 1547-48 (1970).
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possible-if only at the time of commitment. Given the longevity of
compacts, the fact that compact negotiations may have to survive several
political administrations, for instance, should not necessarily be
troubling. Such a long-term commitment should represent much more
than a passing whim or a political sop.
From this perspective, attempts to accelerate compacting by limiting
the ability of states to control the content of their agreements are
fundamentally misguided. Traditionally, governors interested in
compacting have appointed interstate drafting committees. These
committees have facilitated free-ranging debate and have generally been
responsive to the state governments that created them. They have not,
however, moved rapidly.' ° In response to criticism about endless delay,
compact proponents have increasingly turned to an expedited procedure.9 ' Under this method, regional organizations and state officials
acting informally devise proposed agreements on their own. Although
ratifying state governments can either approve or reject the resulting
documents, they neither shape the content of the proposals nor have an
institutional mechanism through which to negotiate alterations.92 States
can articulate their reasons for rejection, but this rapidly becomes a poor
means of bargaining. States that would like to make changes lack
established fora in which to deal collectively with the other states that
have yet to ratify. Moreover, they must also persuade states that have
already adopted the proposed agreement to modify their approval
legislation, an inherently more difficult project than amending a
submission yet to face and survive legislative scrutiny.93 Meant to end
"dithering" and to force commitment, such a constraining "reform" only
worsens the dilemma of bindingness the more it achieves its purposes.
This is not to say that traditional methods of compact negotiation
lack flaws. Like the expedited procedures, if to a lesser extent, joint
negotiating committees have structural deficiencies that may push states
toward positions that do not best represent their preferences, even at the
90. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 6-7; Heron, supra note 58, at 9; JULIUS H. COHEN,
THEY BUILDED BErTER THAN THEY KNEW 334-36 (1946) (autobiographical account of elaborate
processes of the New York-New Jersey Port Authority negotiating committee).
91. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 7; Heron, supra note 58, at 9.
92. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 7.
93. See FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 17 (1976); Heron, supra note 58, at 9. The Interstate Compact for the
Supervision of Parolees and Probationers was the first compact subject to this abbreviated
procedure. Proposed by the Interstate Commission on Crime, an extra-legal organization of state
officials, it was negotiated without prior state approval. The first states ratified it in 1935. See
HARDY, supra note 39, at 7-8; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS,
1783-1956, at 32 (1977). Today, all fifty states, along with the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico,
belong. See Heron, supra note 58, at 10.
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time of compacting. First, these committees are not permanent institutions, but are instead created for particular negotiations. Even if
committee members are experts on the subject matter of the proposed
compact, their probable unfamiliarity with the compacting form may be
substantially disabling. Second, single-issue compacts94 may offer no
opportunity for the trading that allows bargainers to express the intensity
of their preferences and thus may result in a parochialism in which
states will surrender nothing because there are no suitable concessions
to receive in return.95 Moreover, simply expanding a compact's scope
to facilitate "logrolling" makes no sense, if one of the problems that we
are most concerned about is that states may subject issues to the
compact form without affirmatively desiring the permanency it
entails.96
Focusing on the democratic tension within compacts reveals the most
fundamental problems with current negotiating processes. When the
supposed plague of delay fades, what is left is a structure that may
hamper states as they strive to come to interstate agreement and then
tightly binds them to their flawed accord.
I.

THE POWER COMPACT AGENCIES EXERCISE

Once in operation, compact agencies are subject to two perennial,
and conflicting, complaints. One part of the compact literature contends
that compact agencies are particularly unresponsive to popular concerns
and particularly autonomous from the democratic institutions of government, even for administrative agencies. The other part protests that
compact agencies are disappointingly toothless, at least in practice. The
problem of permanency makes both schools of criticism simultaneously
understandable. Given the broad immunity that compact agencies enjoy
from amendment or termination by the governments most likely to
supervise them,97 their unresponsiveness is both unsurprising and
highly troubling. In light of the vastly limited control states exercise
94. Interstate compacts historically have been limited to a single subject, although the BiState Development Agency Compact between Missouri and Illinois, the Delaware Valley
Regional Planning Commission, and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments are
three examples of multipurpose compacts. See Galowitz, supra note 24, at 118-21; see also
Muys, supra note 81, at 158.
95. On the advantages of logrolling, see Edwin T. Haefele, A Utility Theory of
RepresentativeGovernment, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 350 (1971); Roberts, supra note 24, at 111-12
("When decisions are made on a project-by-project basis, and when projects have geographically
concentrated benefits, almost any representative of a geographic constituency will tend to take
a narrow, constituency-oriented view.").
96. See infra text accompanying notes 142-57.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 3-13.
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over the entities they create, their tendency to form weak compacts or
to undercut operative compact agencies,98 especially as time passes and
the agency becomes increasingly less in tune with current state
priorities, is predictable and somewhat reassuring.
Agency compacts invariably provide that elected state officials will
exercise some form of oversight and occasionally include provisions to
facilitate public access to compact decisionmaking. Yet these controls
have not prevented the agencies from exercising an extraordinary
measure of independence. More conscientious drafting and more
attentive supervision could bring compact agencies under better
democratic control. But the agencies' oft-noted disregard for outside
concerns, which the New York-New Jersey Port Authority best exemplifies, seems intrinsically linked to their relative security from the threat
of termination or amendment.
At the very least, the governors of the party states normally appoint
compact agency commissioners and may remove them for cause.99
Compact agencies are also generally subject to annual reporting
provisions," open record requirements,'
and audits."° In addition, several agencies must open all meetings to the public and have
special public hearings before making significant decisions.0 3 Perhaps
most importantly, some agency compacts permit gubernatorial veto of

98. See infra text accompanying notes 132-36.
99. See GRAD, supra note 21, § 3.04, at 3-379; LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 34-35
(quoting Palisades Interstate Park Compact) C"'Each member of the commission may be
removed from office for neglect of duty or misconduct in office by the governor of the state of
which such member is a citizen .... ' "); id. at 70; Leach, supra note 43, at 672-73 (noting that
compacts often have "provisions for the removal of officers found guilty of malfeasance");
Robert W. Tobin, The InterstateMetropolitan Districtand Cooperative Federalism, 36 TUL. L.
REV. 67, 81 (1961).
In some cases, commissioners are state officeholders, executive department officials, or state
administrators serving ex officio, an arrangement that, one would think, furthers agency coordination with state government. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 48; Muys, supra note 81, at
170; Joseph F. Zimmermann, PoliticalBoundariesandAir Pollution Control,46 J. URB. L. 173,
192 (1968) (discussing Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact Commission, in
which governors of signatory states are ex officio members).
100. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 47-48; Leach, supra note 43, at 672; Tobin,
supra note 99, at 82.
101. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 38-39; Leach, supra note 43, at 672-73; Tobin,
supra note 99, at 81.
102. See Leach, supra note 43, at 672-73; Tobin, supra note 99, at 81.
103. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 38; Muys, supra note 81, at 162-63 (discussing
the Delaware River Basin Compact); Tobin, supra note 99, at 81-82.
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agency policies"° and, less frequently, require legislative approval of
supplemental agency plans."
Despite these controls, there is a broad consensus that compact
agencies are remarkably unconcerned about popular needs and desires,
even compared to state and federal agencies. 6 Virtually unknown to
the public, they tend to be nominally led by officials whose main
interests and responsibilities lie elsewhere and dominated by staff that
prefers to keep the agency far removed from the vagaries of state
politics."° Capture by private economic interests is also a perennial

104. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 36 (describing gubernatorial veto provisions
in the New York-New Jersey Port Authority Compact, the Maine-New Hampshire Interstate
Bridge Compact, and the Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Compact, by which a governor can veto
any action of a commissioner appointed from her state); id. at 41 (quoting the Delaware River
Basin Compact) (detailing a provision in the Delaware River Basin Compact providing that the
Authority "may not construct, erect, or otherwise acquire 'any new facility or project' " until
the party state governors have consented to the project); Leach, supra note 43, at 672-73; Tobin,
supra note 99, at 81.
105. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 36-37 (discussing the New York-New Jersey
Port Authority Compact and the Delaware River Basin Compact); Leach, supra note 43, at 67273; Tobin, supra note 99, at 81.
106. See, e.g., RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 295-96; Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Constitutional
Basesfor Regionalism:Centralization;InterstateCompacts; FederalRegionalTaxation, 33 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 47, 77 (1964) (recounting "the sorry past record of interstate compact agencies
in regard to their responsiveness and responsibility"); Lewis C. Green, State Controlof Interstate
Air Pollution, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 323 (1968); Leach, supra note 43, at 673-74;
Charles McKinley, The Management of Water Resources Under the American FederalSystem,
in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 328, 347 (Arthur W. Macmahon ed., 1955)
(describing compact agencies as "cumbersome, jerry-built structures lacking in region-wide
political responsibility, parasitic on national finance, and negative or unduly dilatory in decisionmaking"). But see LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 37 ("[M]embers of interstate bodies are
usually careful to act in general accordance with state policy. To do otherwise would be to make
the agency's operations difficult if not impossible, for interstate agencies, like any other units
of government, operate within the realm of practical politics."); MUYS, supra note 34, at 334-36
(dismissing the fear that "interstate compact commissions generally are not as politically
responsive as traditional state and federal agencies"); Muys, supra note 81, at 171 (discussing
the political accountability of compact commissions).
107. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY 200 (1974) ("[S]tate and national politicians, when acting in a regional setting, will
nonetheless act to pursue their state and national political interests and rely principally upon the
advice of aides who normally assist them in the bulk of their work on a nonregional level of
government."); LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 222-24 ("[M]ost compact agencies come to
be identified in the public mind and in legislative circles with their staffs and not with the
members themselves. The typical staff, under its executive director, tends both to initiate and
to carry out policy."); RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 48-49 ("If the general population of the area
has only the vaguest knowledge of the [Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development Compact] agency
and its activities, this is not unusual for agencies of this type, which prefer to avoid the white
light of publicity except when it is useful to their designs, and which are removed from the
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problem,' although its extent appears to be highly contextual, a
function of the officials involved, the strength of the private interest, and
the degree to which the interest group has decided to concentrate its
resources at the state or interstate as opposed to the federal level."° At
a minimum, compact agencies tend to be even quicker than other
administrative agencies to establish influential industry advisory committees and to be less likely to institute effective channels of communication with the public."0
direct-and educational-operation of the electoral processes."); id. at 296 ("[W]ith increasing
tenure there comes decreasing control by [the compacts'] creators, and increasing control by the
specialists and technicians who handle their day-by-day activities."); Ross D. Netherton, AreaDevelopment Authorities:A New Form of Government by Proclamation,8 VAND. L. REV. 678,
691-92 (1955) ("It is sometimes said that the public must be satisfied with the methods and
policies of Public Authorities because one hears so few complaints. Yet under the circumstances,
lacking information and practical remedies, this argument becomes ... hollow."); Note,
Congressional Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J. 1416, 1428 (1966) ('The
political irresponsibility of the authorities' regional planners is another potential source of
trouble. For years, critics have attacked the philosophy of 'objective' regional planning, free
from the 'taint' of political influence."),
108. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 31 ("The [Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact]
Commission may even be considered harmful to sportsmen and anglers, to the extent that the
compact agency has frustrated efforts to use the national government to regulate the fisheries.
This seems anomalous in view of the fact that recreational interests were in the forefront of the
movement to create the interstate agency. But if we consider the founding process as a
whole.., we find that commercial fishery groups were the prime movers of the compact. It is
not surprising that, where sport and commercial fishery interests are inconsistent, the compact
has reflected the interests of the latter."); RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 309 ("In this new stage
of federalism's evolution, the people of the United States appear to play a diminished role.
Authority, planning, negotiation, decision-making, administration move into the realm of [inter
alia] special economic development interests .... "); id. at 152 ("All present [Great Lakes
Basin] commissioners have had close and active identification with Great Lakes matters and
some have ties or interlocking relationships with various private special interest groups in the
water field."); Note, Interstate Agreements, supra note 81, at 282 ("State governments have
traditionally been more susceptible to pressure from economically powerful interests opposed
to extensive emission controls.").
109. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 22 (describing the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Compact and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, which respective industries did much to
create and which industries have used "to prevent unwelcome governmental influence on their
industries [and to] secur[e] services and favorable decisions from other governmental agencies");
id. at 56 ("The intention in most cases has been to prevent governmental regulation that would
be detrimental to the interests of these [private enterprise] groups. Since industries generally
enjoy effective access to the legislatures and administrative agencies of the states in which they
are located, at the state level they can more easily prevent regulations which they perceive as
inimical to their interests."); infra text accompanying notes 144-49.
110. See ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 202-05 (concluding that "a river basin
agency that seeks to develop a set of regional political institutions will tend to be dominated by
the best organized groups (i.e., the polluting firms and cities)," while compact officials will have
great difficulty "in obtaining substantial exchanges of opinion" from public interest groups,
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Clearly, there is much party states, compact agency commissioners,
and future compact drafters can do to strengthen democratic control over
compacts. Most of the restraints in place are radically under-utilized.
State governments have made little effort to integrate interstate agencies
into their legislative or administrative framework, placing the onus on
compact commissioners to carry out informal liaison.111 Although
governors generally have wide discretion over their appointments,
commissioners from the private sector have disproportionately hailed
from industry."' In turn, the lack of information states collect and the
predictably muted differences between commissioners has no doubt
contributed to the remarkably low rate of gubernatorial vetoes and the
even rarer incidence of removal hearings.' Legislative subcommittees
and state administrative working groups particularly devoted to compact
agencies might noticeably ameliorate some of these problems. Compact
commissioners, for their part, could prioritize liaison with state

whose representatives will be hard to identify and who will, in turn, have more difficulty
communicating with their members); LEACH & SUGG, supranote 21, at 39 ("The Pacific Marine
Fisheries Compact... requires the commission it creates to confer with an advisory committee
representing industry and other private interests on any recommendation it desires to make for
either state or federal action."); MUYS, supra note 34, at 88-89 ("Initially, [the Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact Commission] sought [the] participation of industrial
representatives who possessed expertise and data that was not otherwise available.... [N]o
general citizens advisory committee was ever formed, nor were steps taken on a formal basis
to secure the continuing views of recreationists."); see also BARTON, supra note 2, at 22 ("Both
[the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission],
while regulatory in form, have been unable (or indisposed) to acquire and wield effective power
over the commercial fishermen and oil producers-the groups which they ostensibly are designed
to regulate. Instead, fishermen and oil producers have used the compacts to prevent unwelcome
governmental influence on their industries. Moreover, the two compact agencies have assisted
the fishery and oil industries in securing services and favorable decisions from other
governmental agencies.").
111. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 48-49 (noting that "contacts between state
executive departments and interstate compact agencies remain unilateral"); MUYS, supra note
81, at 167; RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 297-98; Leach, supra note 43, at 672-74 ("In no state,
however, even in the executive branch, has a single official or department been specifically
charged with maintaining liaison with the interstate authorities to which that state is party
....");Tobin, supra note 99, at 82-83 (contending that the Missouri-Illinois Bi-State
Development Agency, which is part of the administrative framework in each of the two party
states, is an exception to this general rule).
112. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 86-87.
113. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 36, 77 (noting that the authors know of only
one case in which the probity of a compact commissioner was questioned); Sidney Goldstein,
An Authority in Action-An Account of the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities,
26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 715, 718 (1961) (arguing that the infrequent exercise of the
governors' veto power "is proof that Port Authority policies are consistent with those of the
governors").
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governments and dramatically expand their efforts to inform the public
and respond to popular concerns, perhaps by utilizing an ombudsperson
and broadening opportunities to learn about and participate in hearings.
Compact drafters (or members of Congress reviewing submitted
interstate agreements) might also liberalize the procedures surrounding
public hearings and the opportunity to comment, mandate
ombudspersons, and require more diversity on compact commissions. In
addition, they could make commission service practically possible for
people without state salaries or business careers by ending the tradition
of providing little or no compensation to agency officers. 14 Compact
agreements might also facilitate government liaison by limiting the
terms of commissioners so that they generally do not outlast the
appointing governor. 5 Finally, compact drafters or Congress could
establish remedial procedures within compacts to keep compact agencies
to their original powers even if making the agencies more responsive to
changing preferences and circumstances remains extremely difficult.1 6
But while democratic control over compact agencies certainly can be
improved, the extraordinarily consistent history of agency autonomy has
roots that seem too deep to be explained away as the consequences of
a failure to undertake straightforward reforms. The problem of perma114. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 76 ("As the habit of providing, at the most,
nominal compensation suggests, the position of a member of a compact agency is among the
least recognized public positions in the United States.").
115. See GRAD, supra note 21, § 3.04, at 3-379 ("[Ihe term of a commissioner of a
compact agency commonly exceeds that of the governor who appoints him. This makes for great
political independence, but it may also make for a lack of responsiveness.").
116. A number of commentators have also suggested that compact agencies would be more
majoritarian, and hence more responsive to popular will, if they provided for representation
based on population or some measure of interest, rather than give each party state an equal vote.
See id. § 3.04, at 3-377 to -378 ('The equal sovereignty concept has given far greater influence
to the smaller states, and has sometimes put the larger state at the mercy ... of the smaller
states."); MUYS, supra note 34, at 366 ("[S]ome weighted representations would seem to be in
accord with the Supreme Court's gradual extension of the 'one man, one vote' rule."); Grad,
supra note 81, at 853 (supporting weighted representation based on the "vast difference in the
amount of [financial] contribution" amongst states); Edwin T. Haefele, Who Are the Appropriate
Partners,24 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 93 (1969) ("A requirement that states delegate
power to basin residents who then elect the members of the commission on the basis of equal
population districts could provide [a] necessary safeguard."); McKinley, supra note 106, at 345
("The composition of an interstate compact agency is bound to push the process of policy
formulation away from regional goals and toward state and local particularism."); Muys, supra
note 81, at 171 ("[C]onsideration should be given by compact negotiators to providing for
weight representation on compact commissions."); see also LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at
34-37 (quoting Arkansas River Compact) (noting that Arkansas River Compact gives each state
one vote and provides that " 'every decision, authorization or other action shall require a
unanimous vote' "); Grad, supra note 81, at 853 (describing the Delaware River Basin Compact,
in which voting is based on equal sovereignty principle).
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nency makes this history both eminently understandable and deeply
disturbing. Set free from some of the core instruments of democratic
control, compact agencies are largely unbeholden to any popular
constituency and seem to become impervious to popular will as a matter
of course. The New York-New Jersey Port Authority is the best
documented, if somewhat extreme, case study.
Upon preliminary review, the controls on the Port Authority appear
to be significant. Authority commissioners are gubernatorially appointed
and can be removed for cause. Each governor can veto the actions of
the commissioners from her state, and both state legislatures must approve new projects (as must the affected municipalities in some
instances). The Authority must submit annual reports to the states and
meet audit and public record requirements." 7 But here, too, the states
have not done their utmost to enforce these provisions". or to draft the
compact as carefully as it might be done to facilitate democratic control.
While meant to limit the agency's scope, the Authority's categorical
inability to depend on state financial support, for instance, radically
decreases its incentives to remain in the states' good graces." 9 Similarly, although suits against the Port Authority are always possible,' the
compact establishes no remedial procedures to facilitate legal control if
the agency strays from its compact.'
Still, one is most struck by the single-mindedness with which the
Port Authority has pursued its powers to their outer boundaries.

117. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 35-36, 42-43; Dixon, supra note 106, at 73-74
& n.106; Goldstein, supra note 113, at 716-18.
118. For instance, the two governors rarely exercise their veto power over the Authority.
See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 36; Goldstein, supra note 113, at 718; see also BARTON,
supra note 2, at 69 ("Attempts to impose controls on the Authority from the outside (either to
force the agency to engage specific problems or to prevent actions by the Authority that would
be detrimental to specific interests) have been sporadic and unco-ordinated .... ).
119. The Port Authority has argued that the requirement of financial self-sufficiency is a
means of democratic control. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 42-43 (citing Matthias E.
Lukkens, Assistant Executive Director of the Port Authority); Dixon, supranote 106, at 74 n. 106
(same); see also Goldstein, supra note 113, at 717 (agreeing).
120. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 397 (1994) (holding that
interstate compact agencies are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity).
121. See ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174, 178 (1921).
122. A number of critics have accused the Authority of large-scale disregard for the
concerns of the general public. Ross D. Netherton has observed that:
The Authority is dependent upon the continued willingness of the investment
bankers to market its securities and makes no pretense about the predominance of
this factor in its policy considerations. The interest of the public in the most
efficient use of bonds and the way in which services are administered is not the
responsibility of the creditor to consider or promote.
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Originally charged with building, operating, and coordinating transportation facilities in the New York City metropolitan region,' the Port
Authority has construed its mandate to allow for enormous autonomy.
Financed with bonds it issues in its own name and user fees on its
facilities, the Authority budgets its own revenues, contracts without
legislative approval, and determines its internal organization. 24
Perhaps more importantly, the Authority has taken it upon itself-with
some support from bi-state statutes in 1931 but without congressional
approval 1z -to group new and old projects together. 26 While at first
glance a mere accounting decision, the move allows the agency to skirt
its compact's prohibition on collecting tolls for facilities that have
already paid for themselves. 27 The possibility of grouping also creates
an enormous incentive for the Authority to initiate projects endlessly. If
the last one was ever paid for, all the tolls would have to cease. The
Port Authority would lose its major source of revenue, and starting
collection again on existing structures would be close to politically
This kind of manipulative interpretation of compact
impossible.'
mandates is particularly troubling given the larger national goal of
facilitating interstate commerce and the specific federal policy that roads
and bridges should be free to all users in interstate commerce once the
structures have paid for themselves.' 29

Netherton, supra note 107, at 691; see also BARTON, supra note 2, at 86-88 ("[Commissioners]
are conditioned both by their personal outlook and [business] training and the autonomous nature
of the compact organizations which they lead to think in terms of the financial soundness of the
compact agencies, rather than the social needs of the metropolitan areas.... mhe Port of New
York Authority, while perhaps able to devote substantial amounts of funds to subsidize marginal
programs, has used its influence to avoid an extensive commitment to mass transportation.");
Dixon, supra note 106, at 73-75.
123. See ch. 77,42 Stat. 174; ERWIN W. BARD, THE PORT OF NEW YORK AuTHORrrY 40,
46-50, 54 (1942).
124. See BARD, supra note 123, at 269, 272-80; Note, CongressionalSupervision, supra
note 107, at 1419.
125. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 87; Celler, supra note 63, at 688 (noting that the bi-state
legislation was never submitted to Congress).
126. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 69; Celler, supra note 63, at 688.
127. See Celler, supra note 63, at 688; Netherton, supra note 107, at 686-87; Note,
CongressionalSupervision, supra note 107, at 1420. As early as 1955, tolls collected on the
George Washington Bridge had paid for the bridge's construction twice. The Holland Tunnel,
by this time, had paid for itself four times. See Netherton, supra note 107, at 686.
128. See Netherton, supra note 107, at 686-87.
129. See Netherton, supranote 107, at 689-90; Note, CongressionalSupervision,supra note
107, at 1420. Many years ago, the Port Authority also attempted to interpret the gubernatorial
veto power narrowly. After the governors of New York and New Jersey vetoed an Authority
resolution opposing the St. Lawrence Seaway project, the Commissioners asserted that the
governors should confine their vetoes to cases of misfeasance or malfeasance, rather than simple
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The Port Authority has not veered off course to the point that
Congress or both party states would agree to its termination, but it has
pushed at the outer limits of this generally forgiving constraint. The
Authority still serves an important purpose, since presumably the public
desires efficient transportation in the New York City metropolitan region
now as much as ever. One might further predict that a majority of the
region's citizens would not be overly concerned about the Port Authority
even if they were aware of its present form, given the difficulty of
cooperation between states, the extraordinary corruption in the local
governments, and the common intuition that removing some institutions
from politics will actually further the public interest. Nevertheless, the
Port Authority as currently constituted is largely unconcerned about
either the specific transportation policies the public wants or the policies
that would serve the public interest in some broader sense. As one early
critic phrased the concern,
[The Authority] does not make its decisions to build
another tunnel, or to expand an airport instead of investing
in mass-transit facilities, in terms of the whole public, or of
the interest of the whole area.... It makes its decisions in
terms of its own, more limited public-i.e., the auto driver
who keeps it going with his tolls, and the bond market.)"
While not utterly disastrous, such imperviousness hardly constitutes
democratic control over a government body that affects virtually the
entire population of the New York City metropolitan area. Although the
above description may be a mite hyperbolic, it is very clear and
certainly unsurprising that the Port Authority's most significant contact
with the general public is oriented outward, propelled by the agency's
public relations machine.'
Just as the protection the Port Authority enjoys from popular rebuke
does much to make sense of its unharnessed pursuit of its narrow goals,
the problem of permanency-the specter of the Port Authority-very
plausibly explains states' reluctance, in the vast majority of cases, to
create powerful compact agencies or to give them much support once
policy disagreement. See Dixon, supra note 106, at 74-75.
130. New Strength in City Hall, FORTUNE, Nov. 1957, at 256, 256.
131. See Leach, supra note 43, at 673-74 ("In an attempt to dispel [the] belief [that the
Authority is undemocratic], the Port Authority early developed an extensive public relations
program."); see also LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 224 ("[C]ritics allege, [that] compact
agencies, once launched, and left as they are to exist in a twilight zone of public consciousness,
may never accomplish what they might or should. As a consequence, they may become less
concerned with performance than with successful public relations-with winning approval by
word instead of deed.").
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they are in operation." If the Constitution protects compacts from
diminishment, the states have tended to bind themselves to low
thresholds.
132. See DERrHICK, supra note 85, at 55-56 ('The [Delaware River Basin Compact]'s
actual functions have fallen far short of its formal powers. Except for navigation control, there
is virtually nothing that the DRBC is not authorized to do with respect to water resources in the
basin, yet its activity has been limited and selective. After more than ten years [in 1974], it is
still seeking to develop a set of functions that will be stable, serve important public purposes,
and not be fatally undermined by the noncooperation of member governments."); id. at 191-92
("[W]hile particular adaptations to the organizational environment vary widely from one type
of regional organization to another, the common result is either specialization of activity or a
low level of activity. Regional action proceeds within a narrow sphere or at a slow pace.");
GRAD, supra note 21, § 3.04, at 3-371 to -372 ("Unfortunately, past experience in the use of
interstate compacts for water pollution control is somewhat mixed, and there is considerable
doubt whether most existing interstate compact agencies have the necessary legal capacity to
undertake the requisite functions under federal law. Most existing agencies, for instance, do not
appear to have the requisite powers to assume responsibility for the management of a pollution
permit program."); LEACH & SUGO, supra note 21, at 213 ("[N]one of [the interstate compact
agencies] has tried to do too much. This effective focus is a tribute to the framers of the
compacts, which typically define the scope of the agencies they create in clear terms."); Muys,
supra note 34, at 337 ("With the exception of the Delaware and Susquehanna compacts, and
perhaps a few others, the authority granted to compact commissions has been exceedingly
limited and their funding accordingly as anemic."); id. at 75 ('The policy document [of the Ohio
River Valley Water Sanitation Compact] was a fairly conservative one, clearly designed to let
the states know that this new institution on the river was not contemplating any serious
boatrocking as far as established state agencies were concerned."); Green, supra note 106, at 323
("As devices to settle boundary disputes, the compacts have clearly been useful. However, as
devices to establish permanent administrative machinery, their value is less clear. They have
been widely criticized as characteristically indecisive and ineffective, as inflexible and as lacking
effective political control or responsibility.... As to regulatory functions, one can point to
virtually no achievement, and very little effort."); Hill, supra note 21, at 2 ("Oftentimes, these
regional solutions have created organizations and mechanisms which have been characterized
as weak and ineffective, with the few stronger regional organizations termed 'political
accidents.' "); McKinley, supra note 106, at 347 ('The interstate compact contrivances thus far
suggested for meeting the need for regional public policy formulation and administration of land
and water resources appear to be cumbersome, jerry-built structures lacking in region-wide
political responsibility, parasitic on national finance, and negative or unduly dilatory in decisionmaking."); Muys, supra note 81, at 166; Ruh], supra note 22, at 294 ("[M]ost observers would
agree that true interstate constructs for pollution control and resource development planning
remain mostly the 'theoretically attractive solution.' Their implementation has not proven
effective in dealing with the necessities of interstate trans-boundary pollution control and
resource development planning problems."); Zerbe, supra note 22, at 226 ("Once established,
[river management] compacts are often ineffective as pollution control instruments."); Note,
InterstateAgreements, supra note 81, at 282 ('Water pollution control compacts have been only
minimally effective, on the whole. For example, under the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation
Compact, effective in 1948, no enforcement power was employed until 1956. As of 1963, the
Ohio Valley Compact Agency had never taken legal action against an industry to secure
compliance with its water quality standards. Five actions had been begun against municipalities
but these were dropped when the alleged offender began to construct treatment facilities.").
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But while the antidemocratic aspects of the compact form make the
imperviousness of compact agencies especially disturbing, a democratic
perspective transforms the weakness of many compact agencies from a
supposedly tragic waste of opportunity to a somewhat comforting check.
The compact literature has harshly criticized states for limiting the
potential reach of their compacts.' State governments, commentators
argue, are so "jealous of their prerogatives"'31 4 that they have lost sight
of both the public interest in interstate cooperation and the possibility
that such cooperation will preclude federal preemption that leaves the
states with even less control.' Jurisdictional protectionism clearly

133. Congress' lack of enthusiasm also has occasionally drawn ire. See DERTHICK, supra
note 85, at 65-66 ("Planners of the [Delaware River Basin Compact] commission hoped that [the
federal representative] would be able to speak authoritatively for the federal government; if he
could not, the commission could not fulfill its functions of comprehensive planning and policy
making for the basin. The dominant aim of federal agencies, however, has been to avoid making
commitments through the DRBC."); Ruhl, supra note 22, at 308-09 ("[M]any compacts fail to
live up to their stated purposes, and the federal government is partly to blame for this. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act pays only lip service to the compact process, and the
federal approval process is burdensome."); Zerbe, supra note 22, at 227 ("Congress was never
very interested in seeing that [river management] compacts would be set up or, if set up, would
work. Under some conditions an interjurisdictional compact can serve as an effective device for
the control of pollution.").
134. HOWARD W. ODUM & HARRY E. MOORE, AMERICAN REGIONALISM: A CULTURALHISTORICAL APPROACH TO NATIONAL INTEGRATION 206 (1938); see also ACKERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 107, at 200 ("[S]tate and national politicians, when acting in a regional setting, will
nonetheless act to pursue their state and national political interests .... "); BARTON, supra note
2, at 177 ("The interstate compact approach to river basin development... tends to accentuate
state and local parochialism at the expense of regional and national goals in water use policy.");
DERTHICK, supra note 85, at 191 ("Proponents of a new organization in American government
usually must agree in advance not to diminish the authority or functions of established organizations: the price of achieving entry into the universe of organizations is a promise not to disturb
that universe. Unless the functions of the new organization can be made to appear innocuous
.... the opposition of threatened organizations is likely to kill it."); LEACH & SUGG, supra
note 21, at 213 ("With regard to some compact agencies, fears were expressed at first that
they would usurp the prerogatives of existing state agencies and might even be in a position
to dominate them."); Muys, supra note 81, at 169 ("[T]he member states of the traditional
interstate compact [were] not ... really committed to a regional approach to river basin
problems. Their participation [under the compact] was cautious and hesitant, concerned
primarily with preservation or promotion of their individual state interests.").
135. See ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 325-26 ("A recurring theme.., has been
the failure of interstate cooperation, even with federal assistance, to be equal to the challenge
of region-wide pollution problems. 'Cooperative federalism' has been an attractive label
concealing spasmodic research, parochial political decision making, and unsatisfactory policy
implementation."); BARTON, supra note 2, at 85 ("Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be
drawn from this analysis of metropolitan area compact agencies is that none has demonstrated
both the perspective and ability to handle within its jurisdiction the emerging social problems-transportation, parking, recreation, air pollution, and the like-that cry out for public
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plays a part in the consistent hobbling of compacts.'36 Nevertheless,
looking at the problem of permanency raises the possibility that states
may shy away from strong compacts at least in part because they do not
want to tightly bind their citizenry to a particular set of policy concerns.
Alternatively, it suggests that, even if state governments act purely from
selfish motivations, this particular display of self-centeredness is not
especially troubling given the democratic imperative to limit compacts
to the most compelling cases.
Focusing on the democratic content of compacts thus resolves a
persistent tension in compact scholarship and brings to light a far more
pressing issue. It makes sense of both the mighty single-mindedness
with which compact agencies have pursued their agendas and of the
equally prominent complaints that states have undercut their own
compacts. What this means, of course, is that compacts now tend to be
either quite powerful and markedly unresponsive or, much more often,
practically useless, but still unresponsive and largely indestructible. One
scenario is dangerous outright; the other represents a reckless resort to
a problematic institution when the states do not actually intend to
accomplish much by such an exercise. The power of the compact form
demands more careful consideration of its use. Part IV, which considers
when compacts should be enacted and how they should be shaped,
addresses the policy implications at the very heart of the problem of
permanency.

action in urban areas across the nation."); MuYs, supra note 34, at 337-38; Ernest A. Engelbert,
Federalismand Water Resources Development, 22 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 325, 341 (1957)
("Even the most ardent enthusiasts of the compact, however, would admit that in no major basin
of the country has the compact succeeded in placing the states on a par with the federal
government in water resources development. No administrative agency has yet evolved out of
a compact with sufficient powers and funds to plan for, much less carry out, an integrated basinwide program."); Green, supra note 106, at 323 ("It has been said that the states are unwilling
or incapable of discharging adequately their responsibilities in the formulation of major
policies."); Muys, supra note 81, at 166; Ruhl, supra note 22, at 309 ("States are ... to blame
for not charging the interstate commissions with adequate regulatory and enforcement powers.
Overall, neither the states nor the federal government have utilized the compact process to its
full potential for addressing interstate water pollution problems.").
136. This, of course, is particularly the case when states compact specifically to discourage
federal action that they expect to be less favorable to their interests. See LEACH & SUGG, supra
note 21, at 196-97 (describing Interstate Oil Compact, which was created to avoid federal
regulation, has recommendatory power only, and no right to financing by member states); Muys,
supra note 81, at 167-68 ("[I]t is clear that some of the water pollution control and flood control
compacts ... were admittedly designed to forestall [federal] action in those two areas."); infra
text accompanying notes 144-49.
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IV. WHEN AND How COMPACTS SHOULD BE USED

Historically, compacts have emerged in essentially three situations.
They have been political accidents, state or private ploys to avoid federal regulation, or the desperate last resorts of states.'37 Generally not
satisfied with the rarity of compacts,'38 the literature urges their more
frequent consideration.'39
Indeed, the amount of concern that scholars and statesmen have
expressed about interstate competition that prevents a state from
pursuing the policies it most prefers might make the infrequency of
compacts seem almost inexplicable." Why doesn't a state that cannot
strengthen its labor, environmental, or regulatory laws as much as it
would like because it fears losing business to other states simply
compact with its closest competitors in order to establish uniform
regulation?
Recognizing the tension between long-term contracts and democracy
makes the relative infrequency of compacts much more understandable
and desirable. In addition to the structural deficiencies in the negotiation
process that hamper satisfactory agreement, 4 ' politicians may have
strong political and ideological reasons to avoid the permanency of
compacting when ongoing enterprises are involved, even if this concern
137. Within these categories, which will be discussed below, there are other factors that
make compacting more or less likely.
First, comfortable abundance and well-aligned interests, while rare, always make compacting
much easier. See Paul Elliott, Texas' Interstate Water Compacts, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1241,

1263, 1267 (1986) ('The Sabine River Compact of 1953... required less than one year to
negotiate.... Because of the relative abundance of water in the Sabine River Basin, the
compact has functioned with little controversy."); Green, supra note 106, at 325 ("Affecting as
it does all industries throughout the area, an air pollution control program brings into play the
economic rivalries between the jurisdictions."); David Nice, State Participationin Interstate
Compacts, 17 PUBLIUS 69, 76-77 (1987) (finding that compacting increased when states shared
trust, sense of interdependence, and perceived ability to work together).
There is also some indication in the literature, which is undeveloped but wholly plausible,
that compacting is made yet more difficult when state governments differ ideologically. See
Leonard J. Feldman, The Interstate Compact: A Cooperative Solution to Complex Litigation in

State Courts, 12 REV.LITIG. 137, 140 (1992) ("It is conceivable... that ideological differences
between states may make a single compact impossible."); DERTHICK, supra note 85, at 48
("Mhe fortunes of electoral politics facilitated cooperation [in negotiating the Delaware River
Basin Compact]. Three of the four basin state governors and both of the big city mayors
concerned happened to be liberal Democrats."); see also Meyers, supra note 27, at 38-39
(recounting how partisan politics within Arizona dealt a fatal blow to the state's ratification of
the Colorado River Basin Compact in 1923).
138. See supra text accompanying note 18.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36.
140. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
141. See supra text accompany notes 90-96.
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is rarely, if ever, clearly articulated. At the same time, a democratic
view on compacts also suggests that the nature, if not the frequency, of
compacts must be rethought. The problem of permanency demands that
compacts be limited to situations in which the case for regionalism is
most compelling and be tailored to ameliorate the antidemocratic aspects
of the compact form. No compact should have a scope larger than what
the project absolutely requires. Each should include the most liberal
amendment and termination provisions constitutionally permissible (with
the narrow, pragmatic, and occasional exception of certain accommodations for bond financing).
As it now stands, the most powerful compacts suggest most strongly
that states do not have much of a theory about when and how they
should compact, that they enter into compacts without affirmatively
desiring permanency. What is most striking about all the compact
agencies with real authority is the degree to which they sprang from
unusual circumstances and pure chance. 42 The Delaware River Basin
Compact, for example, was the synergistic product of a Supreme Court
decree, a major flood, and a few very committed advocates. 43
The compacts that are systematically the least powerful only support
the conclusion that states compact without deliberating about the
purposes and problems of the form." Most often, state or private

142. Martha Derthick calls these compacts "political accidents." See DERTHICK, supra note
85, at 192 ('The main thing to be said about the strong organizations (the leading cases) is that
they are political accidents, the product of ad hoc coalitions whose success was fortuitous in
important respects. Each resulted from circumstances that singly and in combination were quite
special and contained a large element of chance. Natural or social conditions created a singular
opportunity for initiatives.").
143. See id. at 192-93. Martha Derthick, the scholar who has most prominently noted the
accidental beginnings of powerful compacts, uses her work to warn compactors against blindly
patterning themselves after their more successful predecessors. See id. at 226 ('The principal
thing that experience suggests is that pragmatism is the best policy: it leads to the most effective
regional organizations.").
144. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 22 ("In general, the functional characteristics of the
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission are similar to the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission. Both interstate agencies, while regulatory in form, have been unable (or
indisposed) to acquire and wield effective power over the commercial fishermen and oil
producers-the groups which they ostensibly are designed to regulate. Instead, fishermen and
oil producers have used the compacts to prevent unwelcome governmental influence on their
industries. Moreover, the two compact agencies have assisted the fishery and oil industries in
securing services and favorable decisions from other governmental agencies."); LEACH & SUGG,
supra note 21, at 216 ("[The states'] concern has been to protect their own power from both the
compact agencies and the federal government, and they have done this by using compacts to
create agencies for joint state action rather than for regional action philosophically conceived.");
MUYS, supra note 34, at 347 ("Unfortunately, the compact institutions created by the states [to
forestall federal action] have too often turned out to be paper tigers unequal to the regional water
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interests have turned to interstate agreements in order to dissuade federal
action. 141 While pragmatically understandable, such resorts are dangerous for democracy. From the point of view of state governments or
private interests, they will be bound by federal law if not by compact,
and they believe that they have more power to shape the compact. Yet
compacts create agencies whose closest democratic supervisors are
hindered in a way that Congress is not. While generally weak, the
compacts that emerge to avoid federal preemption are strong symbols
of a pervasive insensitivity toward or misunderstanding about the
particular dangers of an institution that is both highly insulated from
popular pressure and near permanent. States and private interests have
balanced the risks and rewards of federal action versus interstate
compacts from the perspective of their own narrow jurisdictional or
power concerns;"4 there is scant evidence that the broader democratic
issues that compacts raise have often entered into this calculus. Again
and again, compacting states and private advocates have made clear that
their primary motivation was simply " 'to forestall complete Federal
domination,' ... to create "a desperately [needed] alternative to
problems."); Green, supra note 106, at 329 ("[I]t seems highly unlikely that an air pollution
control compact will successfully clear the air unless the purpose of those who sponsor the
compact, and of those persons who will ultimately serve on the compact commission, is simply
to clear the air. If the real motive is to delay or forestall the advent of federal intervention, there
will be no effective action.").
145. See GLENDENING & REEVES, supra note 2, at 282-83 ("[Mlany compacts, especially
in the river basin category, result from activities of private economic groups with special
interests in the resources involved .... They use the compact device to block stronger national
action or control because they feel more competent to deal with the states than with the national
government."); id. at 282-83 ("Substantial evidence exists that the states use compacts to protect
their power in the federal system, and such use is applauded by the strong supporters of the
states."); MuYS, supra note 34, at 346 ("A recurring criticism of compacts is that they are
utilized by the states not as positive institutions of regional water management, but to delay
necessary action on regional water problems by the federal government.").
146. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 56 ("The intention in most cases has been to prevent
governmental regulation that would be detrimental to the interests of these [private enterprise]
groups. Since industries generally enjoy effective access to the ...agencies of the states in
which they are located, at the state level they can more easily prevent regulations which they
perceive as inimical .... ); id. at 31 (describing the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact
and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission, which the respective industries helped create
because they believed compacts would dissuade federal regulation and could be controlled);
GLENDENING & REEVES, supra note 2, at 282-83.
147. WILLIAM G. LEUCHTENBURG, FLOOD CONTROL POLITICS: THE CONNECTICUT RIVER
VALLEY PROBLEM, 1927-1950, at 200 (1953) (quoting W.J. Scott, a principal architect of the
New England Pollution Control Compact); see also BARTON, supra note 2, at 177 ("The
interstate compact approach to river basin development.., tends to accentuate state and local
parochialism at the expense of regional and national goals in water use policy."); EDWARD J.
CLEARY, THE ORSANCO STORY: WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE OHIO VALLEY UNDER
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federal control,"'48 which they predicted would be a less favorable
means of resolving the problem.'49 In short, Congress would be wise
to scrutinize such agreements particularly well.
Compacts as last resorts,"5 the final major category, are much less
problematic from a democratic standpoint. After all, the main imperative
the problem of permanency creates is to limit compacting to instances
of pressing need. Yet here, too, it is apparent that compacting states
have not actually focused on the antidemocratic character of compacts.
The resort to compacts, even in desperation, can be refined significantly.
Currently, many compacts emerge from conundrums that Congress,
which is free from the confines of the contract impairment clause, could
resolve. For instance, the Delaware River Basin Compact, which
established one of the most powerful compact agencies, was enacted
AN INTERSTATE COMPACT

42 (1967) (noting that the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation

Compact "represented an alternate to federal intervention, which the states did not want and
which many individuals rejected").
148. Richard H. Leach, The Interstate Oil Compact: A Study in Success, 10 OKLA. L. REV.
274, 284 (1957) (commenting sympathetically on the Interstate Oil Compact).
149. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 56-57 (describing the role that various examples of this
type of compact have played in delaying effective action); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 147, at
250 (arguing that impetus for interstate compacts has come "from those [private] forces which
believed that the states, or a combination of states, would be less successful than the federal
government in halting the opposition of these private interests"); Interstate Environment
Compact: Hearingson S. 907 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,92d Cong., 1st Sess.
86, 91 (1971) (statement of Donald M. Mosiman of the Environmental Protection Agency
quoting official EPA letter to the Judiciary Committee) (" '[A] compact which established
dilatory procedures, or which provided an inadequate commitment of resources from the
signatory States, could have the effect of delaying the establishment of enforceable standards or
plans.' ").
150. See LEACH & SUGG, supra note 21, at 177-78 (describing formation of Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact) ("Then came the severe droughts of 1930 and 1934, which
so reduced the amount of available water in the rivers that only the most callous could ignore
any longer the prevailing stench or overlook the menace it represented to the public health
throughout the region."); MuYs, supra note 34, at 331 ('The record of compact negotiations
suggests that where there has been sufficient motivation to reach agreement, negotiations have
been expedited. This certainly was true with respect to ... the Upper Colorado River Compact
negotiations in 1946-48, when future development in the basin was dependent on reaching
agreement .... "); Darr, supra note 30, at 358 ('The compact has come to be seen as a device
of 'last resort' due to the difficulties of implementation and its variable success in practice.");
Leach, supra note 43, at 668 ("One is impressed, first of all, by the fact that the interstate
authority has more often than not been ground reluctantly out of the necessities of the case
rather than adopted easily and early in the search for solution to an interstate problem. Indeed,
it appears that the common pattern has been for the authority device to be used as a sort of last
resort."); id. ("Certainly the Port of New York Authority was born out of desperation over a
seemingly hopeless impasse between New York and New Jersey over the increasingly complex
problem of transportation in the port area. It was accepted finally as the only way remaining to
settle the bitter wrangling and bickering that had marred the relations between the two states.").
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when only the need for coordinated action in the basin was clear.
Although the Supreme Court had allocated the river's water,' the
multiplicity of federal agencies with overlapping jurisdiction in the basin
were unable to respond effectively to a disastrous flood" and rapidly
escalating pollution problems, 53 or to devise a comprehensive development plan."5 At the same time, much of the federal bureaucracy
actively opposed a basin compact and instead offered to respond to state
concerns by consolidating federal activity.' 5 The basin needed regional
coordination, but when a small core of devoted proponents ultimately
pushed through their interstate compact, 156 the alternatives had been
left largely unexplored."5
Given the commitment compacts entail, states should resort to
compacts that create ongoing, active enterprises only when no other
viable option remains. The tension between democracy and permanency
demands that such compacts be enacted only when their advantages are
most compelling: when geography, economics, or a prisoner's dilemma
of interstate competition require a regional solution; 5 1 when any
interstate agreement must be a compact because it may infringe on
federal power; and when trusting the matter to Congress is not a realistic
possibility.
As a first step, such a project requires a systematic examination of
the distinction between compacts and other interstate agreements, which
can take the form of ordinary interstate contracts or uniform laws that
depend on reciprocation. While courts have found that a number of
interstate agreements do not require congressional consent, they have not

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
Congress

DERTHICK, supra note 85, at 48.
id.; MuYS, supra note 34, at 331-32.
MUYS, supra note 34, at 331-32.
id.
See DERTHICK, supra note 85, at 192-93.
See id.
The Pecos River Compact was also established in the face of a pressing problem that
could have resolved. As Richard H. Leach and Redding S. Sugg, Jr. have reported:
See
See
See
See

If it had not been for the fact that all the while [New Mexico and Texas] were
bickering, the waters of the Pecos were becoming scarcer and decreasing in quality,
the logic of a solution by compact might never have been brought home to either
state.... To attack all of [the river management] problems successfully was
admittedly beyond the capacity of either state alone, yet neither state wished to turn
them over for solution to the federal government. An interstate compact seemed to
be the least disagreeable means of attacking them.
LEACH & SUGG, supra note

21, at 159.

158. See supra text accompanying notes 20-33.
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provided much of an underlying theory for making the distinction." 9
Although there is abundant case law and literature on the reaches of
federal power, scholarly discussion about which classes of interstate
agreements must take the compact form has similarly consisted of the
loose use of shibboleths like "[m]ental health, criminal law, education,
and child welfare compacts are a few examples of compacts in
traditional state areas that do not require congressional consent"'R-which a jurisprudence that tends to give states more leeway
in matters they have historically dominated only encourages. This
difference has been so inadequately conceptualized that states are
frequently unable to determine whether an agreement requires congressional consent,' 6' and routinely seek approval in doubtful cases."
This practice is dangerous because it directly binds the agreements to
the compact jurisprudence on permanency,'63 but the extent of the
problem is again unclear because neither the courts nor the scholarly

159. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1978)
(involving reciprocal tax agreements); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1959)
(upholding the Uniform Law to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without the
State in Criminal Proceedings); St. Louis & San Francisco R.R. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562
(1896) (upholding an agreement between states to extend a railroad line); McComb v.
Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding the Interstate Compact on Placement
of Children); Fraser v. Fraser, 415 A.2d 1304, 1306 (R.I. 1980) (upholding the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Child Support Act); State v. Doe, 178 A.2d 271, 275 (Conn. 1962)
(upholding compacts for the care of the poor); Ex parte Tenner, 128 P.2d 338, 341 (Cal. 1942)
(upholding the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision).
In addition the Supreme Court has speculated about agreements to which the compact
requirements would not apply. See Virginia, 148 U.S. at 518 (listing as possible examples small
land sales between states, joint action against epidemics, and contracts for transporting one
state's goods through another).
160. HARDY, supra note 39, at 16. Paul T. Hardy adds (with Herbert H. Naujoks'
agreement) that "neither compacts created to establish channels of interstate cooperation nor
recommendatory commissions require congressional consent because they are designed only to
improve interstate relations or to provide joint study and advisory mechanisms." Id.; see also
Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and Between States and a
Foreign Power, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 219, 225 (1953). Without support or much analysis,
Frederick Zimmermann and Mitchell Wendell have similarly contended that "interstate compacts
which integrate state services, state administration or state law in areas where state action is
usual or predominant do not require Congressional consent." ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra
note 93, at 24.
161. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 13 ("The congressional consent requirement has been
and continues to be the most litigated and contested aspect of interstate compacts."); RIDGEWAY,
supra note 59, at 46-47 (suggesting difficulty of arriving at "fixed policy or formula" for
determining which compacts require consent).
162. See Celler, supra note 63, at 686; Ellickson, supra note 60, at 1654-55; Engdahl, supra
note 75, at 69-70.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 72-78 (discussing Cuyler v. Adams).
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literature has produced a coherent explanation of the status of noncompact interstate agreements under the contract impairment clause.
Courts, compacting states, and scholars should draw on the rich
jurisprudence about the scope and nature of federal power to determine,
more precisely and more reasonably, which types of agreements may
" 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.' ""a When they have done so, and have determined that a
particular proposed agreement must be a compact, actual resort to the
compact form should be highly contextual, dependent on the availability
and adequacy of federal action. Most crucially, there certainly will be
some instances in which Congress simply has no will to act and cannot
be persuaded otherwise. As noted above, the federal legislature has had
a notoriously difficult time allocating between states and between public
and private interests. To the extent that a problem only concerns a
small region of the country, Congress may be even more inclined to
skirt divisive issues. In addition, there may be situations in which
Congress, although freed from the bonds of permanency, is still less able
to devise a solution that responds to and furthers collective selfdetermination. For instance, a number of commentators have argued that
the states are more likely than Congress to understand the particularities
of regional problems, more able to tailor diverse and innovative
solutions to these particularities," 6 more responsive to regional variations in citizen preferences," and more motivated to regulate as
164. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 471 (1978)
(quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363, 369 (1979) (quoting and affirming Virginia
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893))).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
166. See ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 93, at 52 (arguing that interstate compacts
offer "[a] rich variety of combinations.., for tailoring the intergovernmental arrangement to
cover jurisdictional gaps"); Kearney & Stucker, supra note 2, at 213-14 ("[The compact] is an
extraordinarily flexible instrument for establishing a legal basis for intergovernmental
relations."); Muys, supra note 81, at 325 ("Perhaps the chief advantage of the compact approach
to river basin management is its adaptability to the particular needs of a basin.").
167. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clauseof the Constitution-A
Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 708 (1925) ("With all our unifying processes
nothing is clearer than that in the United States there are being built up regional interests,
regional cultures and regional interdependencies. These produce regional problems calling for
regional solutions."); Meyers, supra note 27, at 52 ("Those who wish to bring decision making
closer to the voter will care [if compacts decline in use]. The action of a state legislature
approving or disapproving a compact is more likely to express the views of more voters in a
signatory state than is approval or disapproval by the Congress."); Zerbe, supra note 22, at 238
("Federal control.., has unfortunately resulted in unduly uniform and in some cases overly
severe standards. It is easy to suggest, as is done here, that [water pollution] standard-setting and
enforcement authorities be set up on a regional basis conforming to the hydrological characteristics, or that at least some geographical diversity in water quality and effluent standards be
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effectively as possible." Whatever the general veracity of such
claims, they suggest the ways in which federal solutions can, in
particular circumstances, be less responsive to public needs than
compacts.
If the federal government will not or cannot adequately address a
problem that requires a regional solution and that cannot avoid the
purview of the Compact Clause, responsible states should weigh the
urgency and magnitude of the issue they confront against the difficulties
the compact form itself creates. In making this assessment, states must
consider the extent to which their potential compact could be made less
problematic in democratic terms.
In general, the less discretionary power a compact agency permanently wields, the less it impinges on the people's continued ability to
collectively determine their own fates. At the same time, creating
compact agencies with so little authority that they are unescapably
ineffectual is worse than pointless; it is a reckless use of a potentially
dangerous institution. Negotiating between these two principles requires
a subtlety not often found in compacting, but the outlines of such a
procedure are clear. Above all else, a compact's scope must be tailored
as narrowly as possible. When the New York-New Jersey Port Authority
was established, one of its most urgent tasks was to standardize railroad
equipment-a straightforward assignment that clearly demanded
interstate coordination and helped spur the Authority's creation.'69 But
the Authority's jurisdiction was drafted very broadly, to cover the
coordination of all transportation in the region. This did nothing to stop
the compact agency from moving beyond prosaic issues like railroad
gauge setting or facility maintenance to deciding matters like the
overarching character of regional transportation, in which the identity of
the decisionmaker was at least as important as the need for a decision
to be made.17
Yet limiting the discretion of a compact agency is only half a remedy
at most. Another way of characterizing discretion is the ability to
respond to changing circumstances. While compact agencies have done
little to reach out to the public, they have not been oblivious to reality
and making them so hardly seems desirable. The clear solution, of
course, is to facilitate democratic intervention into compact agencies. At

allowed."); Zimmermann, supra note 99, at 180 (quoting 1967 Republican Coordinating
Committee) (" 'To us it is evident that programs to combat air pollution must be tailored to meet
the varied needs of individual regions and areas.' ").
168. See Briggett, supra note 63, at 753.
169. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 86.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 122-31.
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present, the states and Congress radically under-utilize existing
mechanisms of control."' These tools could be employed more
frequently and made stronger." But Congress is several steps removed
from compact agencies, and the states-the democratic institutions
closest to their compacts-have proven unable or unwilling to engage
in the careful monitoring that veto authority, reporting requirements, and
the like demand."r The more sweeping powers of termination and
amendment-and exploring the limits of the contract impairment
clause-thus become crucial, both because termination and amendment
are the most serious threats any administrative agency can face and
because they are a means of control that the states may actually be able
to utilize relatively effectively.
States have not yet tested the constitutional boundaries. With few
exceptions," agency compacts require unanimous consent for amendment 75 and withdrawal or termination.17 6 Nevertheless, placing the
Constitution's demands aside for one moment, the policy case for
permanency in agency compacts is weak. Unlike boundary disputes in
which simple resolution overshadows all other considerations, the
legitimate justification for agency compacts-furthering the public
interest by addressing a problem that requires a regional solution-in no
way suggests that heightening the efficacy of current policies, to the

171. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 111-16.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 99-110.
174. See MUYS, supra note 34, at 63 (listing specific examples).
175. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 21 ("[O]ften amendment and revision of a compact can
be accomplished only by a return to the original negotiation and ratification process."); Forer,
supra note 81, at 342-43 ("No water compacts to date have a built-in mechanism permitting the
parties to adjust their rights in accordance with changed conditions."); Leach, supra note 43, at
671 (describing the Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development Agency).
176. See MuYS, supra note 34, at 19-20 ("[As of 1971,] [n]one of the [water] compacts
specify a termination date, either absolute or conditional. Almost all follow generally the
approach of the Arkansas River Compact between Colorado and Kansas which provides that it
'shall remain in effect until modified or terminated by unanimous action of the states and in the
event of modification or termination all rights then established or recognized by this compact
shall continue unimpaired (art. IX).' Such provisions simply appear to state the obvious effect
which would flow from the agreement absent any express provision to the contrary."); Heron,
supra note 58, at 11-12 ("A typical provision for termination is contained in the Colorado River
Compact, which provides that the compact can be terminated only by the unanimous agreement
of the signatory states.").
Some of the exceptions to unanimity have done little to facilitate the prospect of democratic
control. See MuYS, supra note 34, at 157; Grad, supra note 81, at 829 (discussing and quoting
the Delaware River Basin Compact, which is in effect for " 'an initial period of 100 years,'
renewable for additional [century] periods unless any party gives notice of intention to terminate
between the twenty-fifth and the twentieth year before the end of the term.").
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extent permanency accomplishes that, should take precedence over the
ability to respond to subsequent changes in the democratic consensus.
What's more, an examination of two of the most compelling reasons
for agency compact finality reveals that permanency's contribution to
effectiveness is often uncertain. Agreements meant to resolve prisoner's
dilemmas are subject to disintegration if fear of betrayal rises. However,
making exit from a prisoners' dilemma compact easier would not make
the compact any less judicially enforceable against a state while it
remained a member.'" The departure of a state might trigger the
collapse of the entire agreement. But until that happened, states would
know that every party state was required to comply until it gave notice
of withdrawal. As long as the agreement remained mutually beneficial,
states would have strong incentives to cooperate: They could be
punished for cheating, and public departure would threaten an agreement
that served their ultimate interests. States surely would withdraw, or
attempt to amend the compact, when they ceased to prefer the established prisoner's dilemma solution. However, at this point, the compact
would have lost its purpose anyway.
Similarly, the demands of bond financing, important only for
compacts that involve huge capital projects, can also be accommodated.
In general, agency compacts that permit termination and amendment
could rely on bonds, as long as they provided for the distribution of debt
and property among the states at withdrawal. While some states have
debt limitations in their constitutions,' it is entirely unclear whether
these provisions would apply to compact-derived obligations.' If they
177. On the enforceability of compacts in federal court, see Delaware River Joint Toll
Bridge Comm'n v. Colbum, 310 U.S. 419,427 (1940); Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565,
591 (1918); Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39, 55 (1870). On the availability of specific
performance, see Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 178 (1930). On Congress' right to enforce
compacts, see Virginia, 246 U.S. at 601 ("It follows as a necessary implication that the power
of Congress to refuse or to assent to a contract between states carried with it the right, if the
contract was assented to and hence became operative by the will of Congress, to see to its
enforcement.").
178. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 88; MuYs, supra note 34, at 302.
179. See MUYS, supra note 34, at 303 ("Although any predictions in this area are highly
speculative, it appears to this writer that the most direct, plausible and persuasive legal analysis
of the relationship to compact agencies of the myriad of state constitutional provisions applicable
to the state and its subdivisions is that such provisions were not designed to encompass interstate
ventures by a state through the compact-device.").
Under current case law, it is clear that if states compacted with the understanding that their
constitutional debt limitations would not apply, they would be bound to their agreement
regardless of subsequent state constitutional interpretation. See West Virginia ex reL Dyer v.
Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951) (stating federal court interpretation of interstate controversies is
supreme). However, such unilateral constitutional interpretation by one state administration
would be democratically undesirable.
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do, states would have to take the possibility of acquiring their compact
debt into account when measuring their total debt levels. This would
surely be politically unpopular, as it would move self-financing
compacts onto the state budget. However, states could mitigate this
problem in various ways: by strictly limiting the amount a compact
agency could borrow; by requiring, subject to later amendment, that all
the agency's financial obligations come due within a limited period after
the compact's inauguration; by choosing to withdraw only after the
compact's debt was paid and imposing substantial penalties on states
that did otherwise; or by attempting to amend their constitutions. All of
these alternatives seem preferable in democratic terms to binding a state
tightly to one policy and one agency indefinitely.
Given the arguments against permanency in agency compacts, there
is no good reason for states to constrain themselves more than the
Constitution demands. This, of course, makes determining what the
Constitution mandates paramount. As a preliminary matter, Congress not
only has unlimited power to amend or override ongoing compacts,'
but it also can control the duration of compacts by granting consent for
only a limited period of time. While this occurs rarely now,' such a
policy would be a better rule than exception. Automatic termination
would guarantee that the party states have an opportunity to reconsider
their compacts periodically, while renewal proceedings would augment
the likelihood of serious congressional review.' At the same time,
predetermined termination dates would only partially ameliorate the
problem of binding states to policies that they no longer support. Until
the preset termination time arrived, states would still be subject to the
contract impairment clause, the contours of which remain largely

180. See supra text accompanying note 52.
181. See HARDY, supra note 39, at 18; Heron, supra note 58, at 16. Congress initially
limited its consent to the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Compact to 15 years, but later
repealed this limit. See ch. 286, 56 Stat. 269, 270 (1942) (enacting legislation containing time
limit); ch. 763, 64 Stat. 467, 467 (1950) (repealing time limit provision). Congress decided to
limit its consent to the Interstate Compact for the Conservation of Oil and Gas to four-year
periods because of concern that the agreement would violate antitrust laws. See ch. 781,49 Stat.
939, 940-41 (1935); MuYs, supra note 34, at 376.
182. In fact, Congress has been somewhat more thorough about overseeing the Interstate
Oil Commission, which is subject to expiring consent. See ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939, 940-41 (1935).
However, this clearly has much to do with the particular concerns that spurred Congress to limit
its consent in the first place. See BARTON, supra note 2, at 14-15 (describing public hearings on
consent renewal and recounting Congress' 1955 decision to require annual report from United
States Attorney General on whether compact commission had violated antitrust laws). But see
RIDGEWAY, supra note 59, at 22-23 (complaining that until 1955 Congress renewed compact
"with little more than the most cursory examination of matters" and that Congress made little
fuss when the Attorney General did not issue required reports from 1959 to 1962).
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unknown. Although unilateral nullification, revocation, or amendment
is clearly prohibited if the specific compact does not so provide,' the
extent to which a compact may permit alteration by less than unanimous
consent is uncertain. A test of this limit is long overdue.
While the full scope of such a project will require decades of judicial
development, its preliminary outline can be sketched. The long history
of compacts prohibiting unilateral revocation or amendment has left
some case law suggesting that such proscriptions are integral to the
compact form. Most notably, the Supreme Court in Northeast Bancorp,
Inc. v. Board of Governors (1985) " ' termed the inability "to modify
or repeal.., unilaterally" a "classic indicia of a compact."' 5 In
addition, a number of scholars have argued that the line of Supreme
Court cases holding that compacts become federal law upon congressional consent'86 should be read to mean that a state's ratification of a
compact binds it irrevocably, making withdrawal impossible-at least
without congressional assent.8 7
At first approximation, these arguments can all be overcome. Its
Northeast dicta notwithstanding, the Court has also suggested, albeit
much less recently, that a compact provision explicitly reserving the
ability to alter, amend, or repeal has "peculiar significance" for the
rights of party states.' Moreover, the Court has described its holding

183. See Sims, 341 U.S. at 28 ("It requires no elaborate argument to reject the suggestion
that an agreement solemnly entered into between States by those who alone have political
authority to speak for a State can be unilaterally nullified .... "); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 1, 13 (1821) (striking down a Kentucky law that diminished the power of a compact).
184. 472 U.S. 159 (1985).
185. Id. at 175; see also Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific Northwest Elec. Power
& Conservation Planning Council, 786 F2d. 1359, 1363 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that the pact
in question "satisfies all [the Northeast Bancorp] indicia" of a compact, including the
requirement that there be "conditional consent by member states in which each state is not free
to modify or repeal its participation unilaterally"); id. at 1372 (Beezer, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the requirement that a compact be binding upon member states).
186. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981); Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge
Comm'n v. Colbum, 310 U.S. 419, 427 (1940). This principle is known as "the law of the
Union" doctrine. Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438 n.7. Cuyler expanded the doctrine by holding that
every interstate agreement concerning "an appropriate subject for congressional legislation"
becomes a compact-and thus federal law-upon congressional consent, regardless of whether
such consent was constitutionally necessary. Id. at 440.
187. See David E. Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Compacts:A Questionable Federal
Question, 51 VA. L. REV. 987, 1019-20 (1965); JoHN M. WINTERS, INTERSTATE METROPOLrrAN
AREAS 15 (1962) (commenting that "the methods whereby compacts will be changed" hinge on
the law of the Union doctrine); see also HARDY, supra note 39, at 10 (assuming, without
elaboration, that compact impairment clause limits less-than-unanimous amendment "to additions
to the basic arrangements rather than... fundamental changes in the original agreement").
188. See Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 418 (1917) ("Congress is
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that compacts are federal statutes as an insignificant twist on compact
law, 8 9 which undercuts the notion that the "law of the Union" doctrine
has significantly tightened the bonds of compacting. In addition,
Congress has occasionally provided that states may not terminate a
compact without its approval,"9 implying that states can act without
Congress when no such explicit limitation exists. Even if the law of the
Union doctrine does mean that Congress has to approve compact
withdrawals, it is uncertain whether this step is a constitutional
requirement or a default rule that specific compact provisions could
override.' 9 More fundamentally, it is unclear how barring unilateral
amendment or withdrawal would serve the purposes of the contract
impairment clause. While the Supreme Court has been strict in keeping
states to their agreements," prohibiting all unilateral action would
essentially disallow a certain category of contracts. Indeed, if the
ultimate goal of the contract impairment clause is to promote contractual
rights-to allow people and entities to order their own affairs as they
see fit through contracting-then the clause may actually support
flexibility in drafting.
The Court may very well come to such a conclusion, given its
renewed concern for state autonomy.'
If it does, the problem of
permanency will all but vanish, and agency compacts will become an
extremely attractive regional solution. States would have no good reason
to bind themselves tightly, and hopefully Congress would be wise
enough to reject any new compacts that did otherwise. Although
preexisting compacts that make amendment and termination difficult
would remain, unhappy states would presumably put enormous pressure
on Congress to override its consent legislation, allowing them to
reestablish their interstate agreements, if at all, under the new regime.
Until this happens, however, compacts should be resorted to only in the
most compelling cases and the least dangerous form. Their scope should
be tailored as narrowly as practically possible, and their provisions on
amendment and termination should be as liberal as constitutionally
permitted.

not prevented by the Constitution from passing laws that impair the obligation of contracts, and
in its enactments the presence or absence of [an explicitly reserved right to alter, amend, or
repeal the compact to which it is consenting] has not the same peculiar significance that it has
in state legislation. It is no doubt a circumstance, but not by any means conclusive.").
189. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438; L. Mark Eichorn, Note, Cuyler v. Adams and the
Characterizationof Compact Law, 77 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1405 (1991).
190. See Heron, supra note 58, at 16.
191. See Engdahl, supra note 187, at 1019-20 (implicitly taking latter view).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 3-13.
193. See supra note 1.
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V. CONCLUSION

Long ignored, the democratic tension within compacts forces a
reevaluation of all of compact law. In this new light, the meaning of
agency compacts and compacting is transformed, a multitude of
practices surrounding compacts become much more understandable, and
the need to judiciously limit the use and nature of compacts becomes
clear. For the moment, the antidemocratic content of the Compact
Clause strips this form of state activism of almost all of its appeal. But
if the Supreme Court ever frees compacts from the problem of
permanency, they may become extraordinarily useful. Even in an era of
devolution, solutions must often extend beyond one state's boundaries.
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